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REGULATION WITH PLACEBO EFFECTS
ANUP MALANI†
ABSTRACT
A growing scientific literature supports the existence of placebo
effects from a wide range of health interventions and for a range of
medical conditions. This Article reviews this literature, examines the
implications for law and policy, and suggests future areas for research
on placebo effects. In particular, it makes the case for altering the
drug approval process to account for, if not credit, placebo effects. It
recommends that evidence of placebo effects be permitted as a defense
in cases alleging violations of informed consent or false advertising.
Finally, it finds that tort law already has doctrines such as joint and
several liability to account for placebo effects. Future research on
placebo effects should focus on whether awareness of placebo effects
can disable these effects and whether subjects can control their own
placebo effects.
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INTRODUCTION
There is a growing scientific literature on the nature of placebo
effects, which I define as the impact that individuals’ expectations
about events (consumption of medication or other products, exposure
to toxins, and so forth) have on their health outcomes following those
events. According to the literature, placebo effects are not confined
to so-called complementary and alternative therapies such as
echinacea or biofeedback devices. Nor are they limited to contexts
such as pain and depression, in which outcomes are typically
subjectively measured. Placebo effects exist in a wide range of
mainstream treatments for ailments with objectively measured harms,
from treatments for ulcers and high cholesterol to interventions that
affect blood pressure and mental acuity.
The literature also finds that placebo effects have a physiological
component. Individuals’ expectations about therapies alter their
health outcomes not only by modifying their behavior in the period
surrounding therapy, but also by triggering physiological (hormonal
or neuronal, for instance) changes during that period. The available
data suggests the existence both of positive placebo effects and of
nocebo effects. By positive placebo effects I mean the traditional
placebo effect: positive feelings about a therapy are associated with
superior outcomes following that therapy. By nocebo effects I mean
that expectations that a therapy has certain side effects make it more
likely that those side effects will follow the therapy. Finally, the sort
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of expectations about therapeutic efficacy that alter health outcomes
can be triggered by a range of stimuli, from previous experience with
a therapy to the price of a therapy.
Although these findings have important implications for legal
doctrine and regulatory policy, very little legal or policy literature on
1
placebo effects exists. This Article attempts to fill the gap by
addressing the question: how should the law regulate behavior when
private agents’ expectations—about drugs, medical care, consumer
products, and even other people’s behavior—affect their own health?
To narrow my focus, I examine the four areas of law most likely to be
2
impacted by evidence of placebo effects.
The field of law that placebo effects most directly affect is drug
law. The data on placebo effects suggests that the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) should consider placebo and nocebo effects
when deciding whether a drug is effective and safe, respectively. That
is, in a placebo-controlled trial, if the placebo effects of a new drug
are significantly greater than zero, then the FDA ought to deem the
drug effective even if the same cannot be said about the
pharmacological effects of the drug. If the drug also passes safety

1. For example, Russell Sobel has an advocacy piece which contends that the FDA ought
to relax its requirement that drugs be pharmacologically effective and approve pure placebo
therapies that are clinically proven to be effective. See Russell S. Sobel, Public Health and the
Placebo: The Legacy of the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act, 3 CATO J. 465, 472–77 (2002).
Professors Kathleen Boozang and John Thomas have taken up the question of whether the use
of pure placebo therapies is compatible with informed consent. See Kathleen Boozang, The
Therapeutic Placebo: The Case for Patient Deception, 54 FLA. L. REV. 687, 731–46 (2002); W.
John Thomas, Informed Consent, the Placebo Effect, and the Revenge of Thomas Percival, 22 J.
LEGAL MED. 313 passim (2001). More broadly, Amitai Aviram examines whether laws
themselves can have placebo effects. See Amitai Aviram, The Placebo Effect of Law: Law’s
Role in Manipulating Perceptions, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 54, 77–102 (2006). In other words,
can public safety laws change private agents’ expectations in a way that modifies their welfare in
a manner distinct from the direct incentive or distributive effects of the laws? That is a very
interesting question, but it is distinct from the question this Article addresses, namely, how
should laws regulate placebo effects not caused by the law?
2. This Article is also related to the extensive behavioral law and economics literature
that Jolls, Thaler, and Sunstein’s seminal 1998 paper sparked. See Christine Jolls, Cass R.
Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1471 (1998). One similarity is that the placebo effect, like many findings in the behavioral
economics and psychology literature, poses a challenge to the assumptions of the neoclassical
economic model of human behavior. See Anup Malani, Identifying Placebo Effects with Data
from Clinical Trials, 114 J. POL. ECON. 236, 237 (2006) (suggesting that placebo effects challenge
the independence axiom). The difference is the challenge to the neoclassical model is not so
serious that the model can no longer guide legal regulation. All that may be required is a
modification of the conventional wisdom about how health is produced, the consequences of
information, and causation.
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review, then it should be approved. To facilitate consideration of
placebo effects in approval decisions, the FDA might consider a slight
tweak to its regulation of Phase III trials. The FDA requires that drug
companies conduct two independent clinical trials to demonstrate
that a new drug is effective. It ought to require that the two trials, if
blinded, have different probabilities of assigning trial subjects to
treatment. This difference would generate differences in expectations
(about the probability of receiving treatment) among subjects and
these differences may be used to estimate the placebo effects of new
drugs. Finally, because placebo effects are driven by expectations
about drugs and expectations about drugs may change over time, it is
important that the FDA conduct postapproval marketing surveys to
determine whether the placebo or nocebo effects of a drug warrant
reconsidering the labeling and perhaps approval of a drug.
A second legal field significantly impacted by the findings
regarding placebo effects is health law. For instance, there are
implications for informed consent. Here, the central question is
whether doctors should be required to inform subjects that they are
employing a placebo for therapeutic purposes. The answer depends
on whether informing patients about placebo effects defeats those
effects. One cannot be certain, but some research suggests it does. If
that research is correct, states have to weigh the value of placebo
therapy against the cost to personal autonomy. Unless a physician has
a financial interest in prescribing placebo effects, however, it does not
seem there is a serious risk that doctors will abuse this privilege.
Another question is whether placebo effects have consequences for
medical malpractice. For example, may a doctor be held liable for
malpractice for employing a placebo therapy that has side effects
(that is, is a nocebo), or for using a pure placebo as a substitute for
treatment with positive pharmacological effects? My view is that a
doctor should be held liable for such actions, though substantive
analysis of the claim ought not to be affected by whether the therapy
operates by modifying expectations or by pharmacology.
A third field that is affected by placebo effects is consumer
protection law. This field encompasses claims of fraud through
misrepresentation or false advertising by sellers of products not
otherwise regulated by the FDA. Two questions might arise: Can a
seller use otherwise unsubstantiated health claims to generate
placebo effects from its product? Can a seller advertise claims based
on the substantiated placebo effects of its product? Currently the law
prohibits both behaviors. But this prohibition reduces the potential
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for consumers to realize valuable placebo effects. Unless there are
unintended harmful consequences from generating placebo effects, a
more prudent rule would allow defendants to offer evidence of
placebo effects as a defense to fraud or false advertising.
A fourth legal field that is impacted by placebo effects—actually
nocebo effects—is tort law. Who should bear losses due to nocebo
effects? By nocebo effects I mean injury that is the result not of the
defendant’s actions but of the plaintiff’s fears about the harms that
flow from those actions. The answer depends on whether the plaintiff
can control those fears or the consequences that flow from them. If
so, standard tort rules concerning victim precaution, such as
comparative negligence and mitigation, rightfully control. If not,
there may be a third party that has contributed to the plaintiff’s belief
and therefore might be joined to the litigation. Often joinder is not
feasible. In that case, and when the harms from nocebo effects are
indistinguishable from harms attributable to the defendant’s action, it
is natural to rely on the existing doctrine of joint and several liability.
The result is that the available defendant bears the losses due to
nocebo effects because of the possibility that the third party cannot
be found. Even when joint and several liability technically does not
apply, it may be reasonable for the defendant to bear the loss when it
could have provided the plaintiff with information—advertising—to
offset fears about the defendant’s product or actions. An added
benefit of this approach is that it requires little reform, or even
recognition of nocebo effects, by the tort system.
Part I of this Article reviews the scientific literature on placebo
effects. Part II examines the implications the current understanding of
placebo effects has for drug law, health law, consumer protection law,
and tort law.
I. WHAT IS KNOWN ABOUT PLACEBO EFFECTS?
There is an extensive literature on placebo effects. A search of
the medical database PubMed for “placebo effect[s]” yields 3424 hits
3
since 1953. The same search in the psychology database PsycINFO,

3. The precise search was (“placebo effect” or “placebo effects”). There were 573 hits for
“placebo effect” or “placebo effects” in the title of an article, using the search ((“placebo
effects” [Title]) OR (“placebo effect” [Title])). PubMed does not gather citations prior to 1949.
See U.S. Nat’l Library of Med., FAQ: MEDLINE Citations Prior to 1949, http://www.
nlm.nih.gov/services/oldmed.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2008).
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which has limited overlap with PubMed, yields 648 hits. These
numbers, however, overstate how much is known about placebo
effects. In part that is because much of the previous scholarship has
focused on placebo effects related to pain and psychological
5
disorders. Most other ailment-treatment combinations have received
scant or no attention. In part this limited understanding is due to
methodological weaknesses in studies of placebo effects.
For instance, studies rarely begin with a precise model of
cognition or definition of placebo effects so that investigators can
accurately design their trials and consider the implications of their
6
findings. Studies frequently employ subjective measures of outcomes,
7
such as self-assessments of wellbeing. These assessments may simply
regurgitate expectations rather than demonstrate changes in objective
outcomes. They may also reflect what the investigator wants to hear
rather than the subject’s “true” health state. Studies are rarely
designed to have externally valid implications. They may modify
8
expectations—with puffery or even direct misstatements —in a
manner that others probably cannot replicate outside of a trial. It is
hard to draw policy-relevant conclusions from such analyses. Finally,
many studies do not provide very “clean” tests of placebo effects
because they fail to control for behaviors that may confound results.
An example is Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche’s oft-cited meta-analysis of
114 studies with a blinded treatment, blinded placebo and unblinded

4. The search was (“placebo effect” or “placebo effects”) in any field at
http://psycnet.apa.org/index.cfm?fa=main.landing (restricted access) (last visited Oct. 13, 2008).
5. A large fraction of these articles focus on placebo effects in pain and a sizable portion
focus on depression. In PubMed, for example, 736 of the 3424 placebo effect articles were on
“pain,” “analgesia” or “analgesic,” using the search ((“placebo effect” or “placebo effects”)
AND (“pain” or “analgesia” or “analgesic”)), and 274 were on “depression,” using the search
((“placebo effect” or “placebo effects”) AND (“depression”)).
6. An exception is my study examining placebo effects in clinical trials, Malani, supra note
2, at 237, 240–44, though in that study I use an extremely simplistic model and make convenient
assumptions (linear effects of expectation on outcomes) to justify my empirical model, see id. at
238–39, 242.
7. See, e.g., Eva Skovlund, Letter to the Editor, Should We Tell Trial Patients That They
Might Receive Placebo?, 337 LANCET 1041, 1041 (1991) (reporting that self-reported pain on a
10cm visual analogue scale (VAS) was lower in both arms of a trial of paracetemol for
postpartum uterine cramping that employed a placebo control than in a trial of the same
treatment and ailment than employed a naproxen control).
8. See, e.g., Antonella Pollo et al., Response Expectancies in Placebo Analgesia and Their
Clinical Relevance, 93 PAIN 77, 78 (2001) (describing how differing verbal instructions in natural
history, classic double-blind administration, and deceptive administrations of anesthesia clinical
trials had a significant effect on patient behavior and opiod intake).
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no-treatment arm. The authors compare health outcomes in the
blinded placebo and unblinded no-treatment arms to determine
whether placebos improve health outcomes. They largely find no
difference between the arms and conclude that placebo effects do not
10
exist. The problem is that subjects in the no-treatment arms know
they are not being treated and therefore may seek out alternative
treatment that elevates their outcomes. This makes the placebo arms
seem relatively less effective.
In this Part, I review and synthesize the literature on placebo
effects. My objective is not to summarize every study, but to highlight
those studies that have relatively sound methodologies and are
among the more probative about the nature of placebo effects. I also
identify research questions that are relevant to law and policy making
but have yet to be addressed. Throughout, my discussion focuses on
placebo effects defined as a change in health outcomes following
treatment that is due to a patient’s expectation about the value of that
11
treatment.
A. Nonalternative Medications Have Placebo Effects
A common piece of folk wisdom, based on my experience, on
placebo effects is that they are isolated to complementary and
alternative medications, such as echinacea, acupuncture, St. Johns
wort, or biofeedback devices. A second piece of folk wisdom is that
placebo effects are generally confined to pain medications or anti12
13
depressants, for which outcomes are subjectively measured. Both

9. Asbjørn Hróbjartsson & Peter C. Gøtzsche, Is the Placebo Powerless? An Analysis of
Clinical Trials Comparing Placebo with No Treatment, 344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1594, 1594–602
(2001).
10. Id. at 1594 (finding no difference in binary outcomes and a slight difference in
continuous outcomes).
11. This review ignores Hawthorne effects, which are improvements attributable to a
doctor’s attention or a change in the treatment environment rather than the treatment itself, see
Stephen R.G. Jones, Was There a Hawthorne Effect?, 98 AM. J. SOC. 451, 457 (1992), and what I
call the red pill/blue pill effect, which are improvements due to the physical form of the
treatment as opposed to the pharmacological content of that treatment. The intuition behind
the policy implication of placebo effects may be used to derive the policy implications for
Hawthorne and red pill/blue pill effects.
12. For an example of depression studies, see Helen S. Mayberg et al., The Functional
Neuroanatomy of the Placebo Effect, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 728, 729 (2002). A potential flaw
in these studies is that they infer placebo effects from the fact that the placebo control group of
a blinded randomized trial display signs of improvement. But the improvement could be due to
natural history (or even the Hawthorne effect, that is, the additional attention subjects receive
when in a clinical trial).
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views are incorrect. In fact, there is very little evidence on placebo
14
effects from alternative medications. And meaningful data suggest
that placebo effects exist with respect to not just pain medications (an
example of which I shall give in a moment) but also treatments for
other ailments.
One of the better studies on the placebo effects from analgesia is
Pollo et al.’s 2001 study on the behavior of postoperative patients in
15
Italy. This study enrolled thirty-eight patients recovering from
16
thoracic surgery for lung cancer in the surgery ward of a hospital.
For purposes of pain relief, they were given an unknown solution
(actually saline) via intravenous (IV) drip and permitted to request
17
supplemental doses of buprenorphine, a weaker cousin of morphine.
Patients were randomized into three treatment groups. One group
was told nothing about the analgesic effect of the saline IV (natural
18
history group). The second group was told that the saline IV was
either a powerful painkiller or a placebo (double-blind placebo
19
group). The third group was told the saline IV was a potent
20
painkiller (deceptive placebo group). The investigators measured
two outcomes: the number of doses of buprenorphine requested, and
self-reports of pain intensity. The study made two important findings.
First, the deceptive placebo group requested less buprenorphine than
the double-blind placebo group, which in turn requested less than the
21
natural history group. Second, all three groups self-reported roughly
22
the same level of pain intensity. Figure 1 of this Article illustrates
23
these findings.
This study is probative because it did not rely purely on selfreports to measure pain. It also looked to behavior (the lack of

13. See, e.g., Lene Vase, Joseph L. Riley III & Donald D. Price, A Comparison of Placebo
Effects in Clinical Analgesic Trials Versus Studies of Placebo Analgesia, 99 PAIN 443, 446 tbl.2
(2002) (indicating the wide use of self-reports, such as the Visual Analog Scale instrument, as a
pain measure).
14. See Franklin G. Miller et al., Ethical Issues Concerning Research in Complementary and
Alternative Medicine, 291 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 599, 603–04 (2004).
15. Pollo et al., supra note 8, at 78.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 80.
22. Id. at 78.
23. Figure 1 of this Article reproduces Figure 4 from the original study. See id. at 81 fig.4.
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requests for additional painkiller) on the theory that it is what
24
economists call a revealed preference. A weakness of this approach
is that one cannot rule out that requests for buprenorphine may
simply reflect the self-reports and not measure pain any more deeply
than those reports. Nevertheless, the study implies that investigators
suggesting pain relief from a saline drip yields subjective, and perhaps
objective, reduction in pain. Interestingly, the double-blind group
experienced roughly half the “pain relief” that the deceptive placebo
25
group received, as might be expected from an equal-probability
assignment to placebo or analgesia. This finding points toward a
model of placebo effects on which the next study of placebo effects
can build. Moreover, the design of the Pollo et al. study implies that
the investigators’ suggestion was equivalent to the administration of
26
four additional doses (mg) of buprenorphine over seventy hours. In
other words, the study has some predictive value: it assigned a value
to the investigator’s instruction that has meaning outside the study
context.
A second study that is probative of the scope of placebo effects is
my 2006 meta-analysis of double-blind trials of ulcer medications and
27
trials of cholesterol-lowering drugs. That study compared subjects in
trials in which everyone received active treatment to trials in which
half of subjects received active treatment and half received placebo
28
control. Subjects in the former trials thought the probability of
receiving active treatment was 100 percent, whereas subjects in the
latter trials thought the probability was just 50 percent. Subjects
actually given active treatment in both sets of trials, however, had the
same pharmacological treatment. All that differed between them was
expectations. The study found that subjects given active treatment in
the former trials exhibited better medical outcomes than subjects
29
given active treatment in the latter trials. That study makes two
contributions to the understanding of placebo effects. First, the study
demonstrated placebo effects for nonalternative medications and for
30
ailments with objective outcomes. The two antiulcer medications

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

STANLEY BOBER, ALTERNATIVE PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 83 (2001).
See Pollo et al., supra note 8, at 80 fig.2.
See id. at 80 fig.3.
See Malani, supra note 2, at 239.
Id. at 238–39.
Id. at 247–49.
Id. at 253.
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examined were H2-blockers, such as Zantac and Tagamet, and proton
31
pump inhibitors (PPIs), such as Prilosec. The main ulcer outcome
was healing of ulcers, which was verified by endoscopy. The
cholesterol trials examined various statins, including atorvastatin, sold
32
under the brand name Lipitor, and simvastatin, sold as Zocor. The
main outcome was the level of low-density lipoproteins (LDL)—the
33
“bad” cholesterol in the blood—which was verified by blood screens.
Second, the study employed a simple model of trial subjects’ beliefs to
nondeceptively manipulate expectations and generate externally valid
34
predictions about the magnitude of placebo effects. The intuition,
which built on Pollo et al.’s findings, is simple. Blinding in a
randomized control trial holds constant subjects’ expectations about
35
their treatment assignment. So when one compares the treatment
arm to the placebo-control arm of a given trial, one observes the
pharmacological effect of the studied treatment. The insight of my
design is that if one has two different blinded trials with different
probabilities of assignment to treatment and compares the treatment
arm of one trial to the treatment arm of the other, one is holding
constant the pharmacological agent but manipulating the expectation
of subjects. If there were placebo effects, one would expect that
outcomes in the treatment arm of the higher-probability-of-treatment
trial would be superior to outcomes in the treatment arm of the
36
lower-probability trial.
This is exactly what the study found. A summary table of the
37
results is presented in Figure 5. Comparing, for simplicity, H2blocker (versus placebo) trials in which 50 percent of subjects are
31. H2-blockers, also known as H2-receptor antagonists, and proton pump inhibitors reduce
the production of acid by parietal cells in the stomach. See BERTRAM G. KATZUNG, BASIC &
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 263 (10th ed. 2006).
32. Statins inhibit the enzyme HMG-CoA reductase and thereby increase the rate at which
the liver clears low-density lipoproteins from the bloodstream. There are many different types
of statins, such as atorvastatin, simvastatin, and lovastatin. See Stefanie Dimmeler et al., HMGCoA Reductase-Inhibitors (Statins) Increase Endothelial Progenitor Cells via the PI 3-Kinase/Akt
Pathway, 108 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 391, 391–92 (2001).
33. LDL levels above 160 mg/dl increase the risk of developing atherosclerosis, which may
cause stroke, heart failure, and loss of limbs. See Jeanette Curtis & Caroline Rea, WebMD,
LDL (Low-Density Lipoprotein) Cholesterol, http://www.webmd.com/hw-popup/ldl-lowdensity-lipoprotein-cholesterol (last visited on Oct. 24, 2008).
34. Malani, supra note 2, at 239.
35. See Simon J. Day & Douglas G. Altman, Blinding in Clinical Trials and Other Studies,
321 BRIT. MED. J. 504, 504 (2000).
36. For a methodological critique, see text accompanying infra note 138.
37. This reproduces Table 1 from the original study. See Malani, supra note 2, at 239 tbl.1.
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treated with ones in which 100 percent of subjects are treated, the
fraction of subjects whose ulcers healed was 11 percent higher in the
100 percent-treated trials. Because the total expectation effect from
consuming a drug outside the trial context was going from an
expectation of 0 percent (certain of no treatment) to 100 percent
(certain of treatment), the placebo effect was roughly double the 11
percent number, or 22 percent. Depending on the specific H2-blocker
at issue, this finding implies that placebo effects are 31 to 213 percent
38
the size of pharmacological effects. The same analysis with statins
(versus placebo) trials suggests that 100 percent trials lower LDL (the
“bad” cholesterol) levels 14.6 mg/dll more than 50 percent trials. This
finding implies a placebo effect of nearly 30 mg/dll or up to 70 percent
39
the size of the pharmacological effects of these drugs.
Later in this Part, I also provide evidence of placebo effects in
the context of caffeine on blood pressure and of energy drinks on
40
mental acuity. Although I do not highlight them, a number of recent
studies have examined placebo effects with respect to the motor
41
functions of patients with Parkinson’s disease and some other
42
ailment-treatment combinations. That said, there are many more
such combinations that have not been examined for placebo effects
than those that have. Given that placebo effects may have nontrivial
impacts relative to pharmacological effects, the yield from exploring
placebo effects in other contexts could be quite high.
Importantly, there are no serious studies—and thus no
evidence—of placebo effects outside the therapeutic context. One
might wonder, however, whether there are nocebo effects due to
silicon breast implants, microwave emissions from cell phones,
electromagnetic fields from power lines, consumption of spinach

38. See id. at 252 tbl.6.
39. Id.
40. See infra notes 70–77, 103–08 and accompanying text.
41. Parkinson’s disease is a degenerative condition of the central nervous system that
impairs one’s speech and motor skills. See THOMAS FOLTYNIE, PARKINSON’S DISEASE: YOUR
QUESTIONS ANSWERED 3, 11, 34 (2003). For studies on placebo effects in Parkinson’s patients,
see, for example, Raúl de la Fuente-Fernández et al., Expectation and Dopamine Release:
Mechanism of the Placebo Effect in Parkinson’s Disease, 293 SCIENCE 1164, 1164 (2001); Raúl
de la Fuente-Fernández & A. Jon Stoessl, The Placebo Effect in Parkinson’s Disease, 25
TRENDS IN NEUROSCIENCE 302, 302 (2002); Felipe Fregni et al., Immediate Placebo Effect in
Parkinson’s Disease—Is the Subjective Relief Accompanied by Objective Improvement?, 56 EUR.
NEUROLOGY 222, 222 (2006); Christopher G. Goetz et al., Objective Changes in Motor Function
During Placebo Treatment in PD, 54 NEUROLOGY 710, 710 (2000).
42. For a convenient list and citations, see Sobel, supra note 1, at 474 & tbl.2.
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43

during an E. coli scare, and so on. In many of these cases, anecdotal
accounts have described health costs, but more rigorous studies have
44
found no pharmacological effects or have proved inconclusive. The
usual way to reconcile the inconsistency between anecdotal evidence
and systematic evidence is to attribute the anecdotal accounts to
unrelated background noise. An alternative approach, however,
would be to explore whether health costs are driven by expectation of
adverse effects. In general, systematic studies into the consequences
of, for example, breast implants or power lines are designed, like most
45
clinical trials, to isolate pharmacological effects, not placebo effects.
The problem, even with systematic observational studies that explore
all effects by comparing, for example, women with and without
implants or neighborhoods close to and far away from power lines, is
that selection bias may confound accurate estimation of placebo
46
effects.
I do not contend that it would be easy to design a study to
explore the effect of expectation on adverse events in a
nontherapeutic context. The most promising approach is likely event
analysis. For example, one might explore the effect that a prominent
news report on health hazards from a product had on the rate of that
health hazard among consumers of that product or the population at
large following the report. But even this approach has important
limitations. The most significant is that any spike in adverse events
could be due to changes in the rate of diagnosing or reporting of these
events, not in the rate of events themselves. Yet the value of this

43. E. coli, short for Escherichia coli, is a bacteria commonly found in the small intestine.
Most strains are harmless, but some cause serious food poisoning. PHYLLIS ENTIS, FOOD
SAFETY: OLD HABITS, NEW PERSPECTIVES 89, 134 (2007).
44. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., SAFETY OF SILICONE BREAST IMPLANTS 112–13 (2000); J.E.
Moulder et al., Cell Phones and Cancer: What Is the Evidence for a Connection?, 151
RADIATION RES. 513, 513 (1999).
45. See INST. OF MED., supra note 44, at 1–12; MARK MONMONIE, CARTOGRAPHIES OF
DANGER: MAPPING HAZARDS IN AMERICA 186–92 (1997).
46. Whereas experimental studies randomly assign subjects to treatment and control
groups, observational studies allow subjects (usually in the real world) to choose whether to
take treatment or the control and then observe the outcomes of subjects. The disadvantage of
observational studies is that subjects who choose treatment may differ in some unobservable
ways from subjects who choose the control. Thus the difference in outcomes across treatment
and control either could be due to the treatment or due to these unobservable differences.
Randomly assigning subjects to treatment and control statistically eliminates these unobservable
differences. The disadvantage of randomized experiments is that they may not be externally
valid because, in the real world, treatment choices are rarely made by coin flip. Observational
studies do not suffer this flaw.

MALANI IN FINAL2.DOC

2008]

11/16/2008 9:52:18 PM

PLACEBO EFFECTS

423

information to regulation may justify the effort despite its
imprecision. After all, noisy or biased information can be more
valuable than no information at all.
B. Placebo Effects Have a Physiological Mechanism
An important weakness of my study, other than the fact that it
performed a meta-analysis that synthesized the results from trials
47
conducted by other researchers rather than conducting a new trial, is
that it did not explore the causal pathway for the placebo effects it
identified. Broadly speaking there are two possible pathways:
behavioral and physiological. In the former case, changes in
expectation modify a subject’s behavior in a way that improves health
outcomes. For example, a subject in a trial with a higher probability
of getting H2-blockers may be more likely to avoid the stress or spicy
48
food that might contribute to an ulcer. This is a placebo effect
because the investigator does not observe the behavioral change. All
the investigator observes is a change in expectation and then a change
in outcomes, a pattern consistent with placebo effects. In case of a
physiological pathway, changes in expectation cause physiological
changes within the body. For example, the bodies of subjects in the
higher-probability H2-blocker trial could begin to produce lower
levels of stomach acid or increase the rate at which stomach lining is
produced.
There are two difficulties with the concept of behavioral placebo
effects. First, it is not the popular conception of placebo effects. The
popular conception is along the lines of the physiological placebo
effects: hidden connections between the central nervous system and
49
the immune system or erstwhile independently run organs. Hence,
one often sees terms like “mind-body interactions” connected with

47. The negative implication is that there might be subtle differences in the clinical trials
that are inputs into the meta-analysis that might reduce the precision of the analysis or, worse,
explain some of the results. I explore but rule out, for example, the possibility of self-selection
of subjects into trials explaining my results. See Malani, supra note 2, at 242–45.
48. It is true that the bacteria H. pylori is now thought to cause most cases of gastric ulcers.
However, that new conventional wisdom is being challenged by recent research. See Shyam
Varadarajulu & James W. Freston, Helicobacter Pylori-Negative Peptic Ulcer Disease,
UPTODATE, Nov. 6, 2007, http://www.uptodateonline.com/patients/content/topic.do?topicKey=
~sNN2bmT1TMaQEP.
49. See, e.g., Gustavo Pacheco-López et al., Expectations and Associations That Heal:
Immunomodulatory Placebo Effects and Its Neurobiology, 20 BRAIN BEHAV. & IMMUNITY 430,
435–41 (2006).
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50

placebo studies. The problem with the popular conception is that
many studies, such as mine, have failed to rule out hidden behavior as
an explanation for placebo effects. A second difficulty with
behavioral placebo effects is that it can “vanish” once the investigator
observes or controls for the responsible behavior. I do not view this
“vanishing” as a problem because, in the real world, consumption of
therapy can have both pharmacological effects and behavioral
51
effects. The latter are driven by expectation, whether or not
observed. And they have real health consequences that ought to be
considered when estimating the full value of the therapy.
Two questions still remain. First, why distinguish between
behavioral placebo effects and physiological placebo effects? Second,
is there any evidence of physiological placebo effects? The reason to
distinguish the two types of placebo effect is that they may have
different implications for legal regulation. I explore this further in
Part II. But the crucial point is that one might suspect that behavioral
placebo effects are more likely to be under the control of the patient
(or tort victim as the case may be) than physiological placebo effects.
Therefore, behavioral placebo effects might be more susceptible to
incentives than physiological placebo effects.
With regard to the second question, the answer is that growing
evidence shows that placebo effects have a physiological component.
Consider two important sets of pain studies. The first set, which
52
includes a classic study by Levine, Gordon, and Fields and more
53
recent studies by Amanzio and Benedetti and Benedetti, Arduino,
54
and Amanzio, examines the effect of naloxone on placebo-induced
analgesia. Naloxone is a drug used to treat, for example, morphine
overdose. It blocks the bonding of opioids, whether made by the body
or not (like morphine, heroin, or methadone), to certain opioid

50. See, e.g., Damien G. Finniss & Fabrizio Benedetti, Mechanisms of the Placebo
Response and Their Impact on Clinical Trials and Clinical Practice, 114 PAIN 3, 3, 5, 6 (2005).
51. For example, joint pain might stop me from typing this manuscript. If I take ibuprofen,
I experience a pharmacological effect (the blocking of pain receptors) and a behavioral effect (I
can return to typing).
52. Jon D. Levine, Newton C. Gordon & Howard L. Fields, The Mechanism of Placebo
Analgesia, LANCET, Sept. 23, 1978, at 654, 654–57.
53. Martina Amanzio & Fabrizio Benedetti, Neuropharmacological Dissection of Placebo
Analgesia: Expectation-Activated Opioid Systems Versus Conditioning-Activated Specific
Subsystems, 19 J. NEUROSCIENCE 484, 484 (1999).
54. Fabrizio Benedetti, Claudia Arduino & Martina Amanzio, Somatotopic Activation of
Opioid Systems by Target-Directed Expectations of Analgesia, 19 J. NEUROSCIENCE 3639, 3639
(1999).
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receptors, which in turn block the sensation of pain. In other words,
naloxone negates the effect of certain analgesics. Researchers
conducting the naloxone studies used different methodologies but
typically employed investigator suggestion to generate pain relief
56
from the placebo. (In other words, subjects were given an inert
treatment like a saline drip but deceptively told by the investigator
that it was a powerful painkiller.) The important finding from the
naloxone studies is that administration of naloxone reverses the pain
57
relief from the placebo. The implication is that placebo analgesics
must operate, at least in part, by generating endogenous opioids that
58
bond with certain opioid receptors. Thus analgesic placebo effects
have a physiological mechanism of action.
One drawback of the naloxone studies is that some evidence
indicates that naloxone may not only block opioid receptors but also
59
independently generate pain. Thus, one cannot readily infer that
placebo analgesics operate by stimulating endogenous opioid
production. A second class of studies addressed this concern by
showing that subjects given placebo analgesia experience a
neurological response similar to that experienced by subjects treated
with real analgesia. The innovation of these studies was to employ
60
neuroimaging devices such as positron emission tomography (PET)
and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to detect changes
in neuronal (that is, electrical) activity accompanying placebo

55. More technically, opioid receptors block the firing of neurons from nociceptors.
Alistair D. Corbett et al., 75 Years of Opioid Research: The Exciting but Vain Quest for the Holy
Grail, 147 BRIT. J. PHARMACOLOGY S153, S153–54 (2006). It is the transfer of neurons from
nociceptors located throughout the body to the brain that generates what is known as pain.
Soc’y for Neuroscience, Nociceptors and Pain, http://www.sfn.org/index.cfm?pagename=
brainbriefings_nociceptorsandpain (last visited Oct. 24, 2008). Opioid receptors come in three
classes, μ, κ and δ, Corbett et al., supra, at S153; naloxone is thought to block mainly μ-opioid
receptors, see G. EDWARD MORGAN, CLINICAL ANESTHESIOLOGY 249 (2001). Hence placebo
analgesics too are thought to operate on this class of receptors.
56. This suggestion is usually done through behavior. See, e.g., Benedetti et al., supra note
54, at 3639 (using the application of a placebo, that is, inert, cream to the subject’s limbs).
57. See Amanzio & Benedetti, supra note 53, at 484, 493; Benedetti et al., supra note 54, at
3639; Levine et al., supra note 52, at 654–55.
58. See, e.g., Benedetti et al., supra note 54, at 3639.
59. Specifically it causes hyperalgesia, or extreme sensitivity to pain. See Richard H.
Gracely et al., Placebo and Naloxone Can Alter Post-Surgical Pain by Separate Mechanisms, 306
NATURE 264, 264 (1983).
60. See Jon-Kar Zubieta et al., Placebo Effects Mediated by Endogenous Opioid Activity on
μ-Opioid Receptors, 25 J. NEUROSCIENCE 7754, 7754 (2005).
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analgesia. The methodology is similar to the naloxone studies. For
example, in the Wager et al. study, pain was artificially generated by
62
administering local electric shock or heat to each subject’s wrist.
Initially investigators applied a placebo cream to each subject’s wrist
63
but told the subjects it was a mild analgesic (treatment state). The
64
cream was removed. Later, investigators reapplied the same placebo
65
cream but told subjects it was in fact a placebo (control state). The
main finding was that the placebo analgesic activates the same regions
66
of the brain that actual analgesics are known to activate.
The main drawback of the brain scan studies is that, because the
67
neurophysiology of pain is not fully understood, it is uncertain
whether brain scans reveal mere correlates of pain reduction or the
causal mechanisms behind pain reduction. For example, it is not
known whether (a) the changes in neuronal activity are the brain
anticipating or realizing there might be or was pain reduction, or (b)
the activity is itself reduction in pain sensation. The first view would
suggest mere correlation, the second, causation. That said, I believe
that one day soon nonplacebo studies of the neurophysiology of pain
sensation will be able to determine the proper view. If it is the second
view, then the brain scan studies will prove compelling.
Outside the pain context, only a small number of studies have
examined the physiology of placebo effects. For example, Mayberg et
al. explored physiological placebo effects from fluoxetine (Prozac) on
68
patients with depression. But the methodology is again brain (PET)
scans, raising the same questions about causation as did the pain
69
studies. Malani and Houser explored physiological placebo effects
70
from caffeine on blood pressure in healthy patients. Our approach
was different, though it has its own limitations.

61. Tor D. Wager et al., Placebo-Induced Changes in fMRI in the Anticipation and
Experience of Pain, 303 SCIENCE 1162, 1162 (2004).
62. See id. at 1162–64.
63. Id. at 1163 fig.1.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See id. at 1165.
67. L.G.F. GILES, 50 CHALLENGING SPINAL PAIN SYNDROME CASES 1 (Heidi Allen ed.,
2003).
68. Mayberg et al., supra note 12, at 728–29.
69. Id.
70. Anup Malani & Daniel Houser, Expectations Mediate Objective Physiological Placebo
Effects, in 20 NEUROECONOMICS: ADVANCES IN HEALTH ECONOMICS AND HEALTH SERVICES
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71

We employed a crossover trial design in which each subject was
72
exposed to three treatments to generate placebo effects. The first
treatment was that subjects were randomly assigned, with equal
probability, to either caffeine or placebo, but not told which
treatment they received. (Subjects were exposed to this treatment
twice—that is, they were twice randomly assigned to caffeine or
placebo but blinded to their assignment.) The second treatment was
unblinded administration of a caffeine pill. The third was unblinded
administration of a placebo pill. The outcomes measured were
diastolic and systolic blood pressure. Our hypothesis was that, if there
are positive placebo effects from caffeine, then blood pressure should
be highest when subjects are given unblinded caffeine because they
are experiencing both the pharmacological effect of caffeine plus the
full expectation that they are receiving caffeine. The second-highest
blood pressure should be observed after blinded caffeine; subjects get
the pharmacological effect of caffeine, but only half the expectation
effect because they know there is only a one in two chance of
receiving caffeine. Following the same logic, the third- and fourthhighest blood pressure readings should be taken after administration
of the blinded placebo and unblinded placebo, respectively. As the
reader might guess, this was exactly what is observed, as shown in
Figure 3 (diastolic and systolic blood pressure, respectively).
But so far this design appears merely to be an extension of the
Malani study, which also used the probability of treatment in blinded
73
trials to manipulate expectation, with the minor variation that the
treatment and outcome were caffeine and blood pressure. The
valuable innovation, however, is that the subjects in the Malani and
Houser study were required to remain seated while reading airline
74
magazine articles. In other words, the behavior of each subject was
held constant. Therefore, the observed placebo effect was likely due
RESEARCH (Daniel Houser & Kevin McCabe eds., forthcoming) (manuscript at 8, 10, on file
with the Duke Law Journal).
71. In a crossover trial, each subject receives both the treatment and the control, first one,
then the other. See BYRON JONES & MICHAEL G. KENWARD, DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF
CROSS-OVER TRIALS 1 (2d ed. 2003). The part that is randomized is whether a subject receives
treatment first or control first. See id. By contrast, in a parallel-armed trial, each subject receives
either treatment or control, but not both. See id.; see also Malani, supra note 2, at 245.
72. See Malani & Houser, supra note 70 (manuscript at 8–9).
73. Malani, supra note 2, at 236, 238–40.
74. Malani & Houser, supra note 70 (manuscript at 9). The logic was that standing modifies
blood pressure and that airlines choose the content of their magazines to keep their passengers’
attention but not excite them. Id.
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to physiological changes within subjects rather than behavioral
changes by subjects over the course of different treatments.
The limitation of our study is that it sheds no light on the nature
of the physiological response. In our defense, it would be hard to do
so without interfering with the physiological response—a rough
75
analog of the observer effect. To determine, for example, the
hormones that mediated the placebo effect on blood pressure would
likely require either urinalysis or blood tests, but such interventions
76
are likely to themselves modify blood pressure. Indeed, this observer
effect is also a problem with the brain scans. Putting an individual
inside an MRI machine may interact with the neuronal activity that
one is attempting to study. One might observe a before placebo/after
placebo change in activity, but it may not be the same change one
would observe outside the study context. Therefore, studies of the
77
physiological mechanism may have limited external validity.
From a policy perspective, the literature significantly fails to
resolve whether this type of placebo effect is subject to patients’
conscious control. Specifically, can people choose to believe that a
therapy will or will not alter their health outcomes, whether in a
positive or negative direction? (Another way to put this is: are the
beliefs that trigger placebo effects endogenous?) Alternatively, can
people “disconnect” their beliefs about the effect of a therapy from
health outcomes following that therapy? That is, can people simply
turn off or negate placebo effects? In the case of behavioral placebo
effects, the answer to at least the second inquiry is: to some extent,
yes. If a person who believes a therapy is likely to work takes actions
to complement that therapy, those actions are said to be voluntary or
conscious. One could give the person incentives to take more or fewer
of those actions. It would be useful to know whether that is also true
for physiological placebo effects. Until the answer is known, I
proceed in this Article assuming—as I think most readers do—that

75. In other words, the observer affects the observed. See IMMY HOLLOWAY, BASIC
CONCEPTS FOR QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 134 (1997) (“The observer effect is an influence on
the research which researchers produce through their expectations, predisposition and
sometimes through their mere presence in the situation under study.”).
76. See, e.g., T Marshall et al., A Randomised Controlled Trial of the Effect of Anticipation
of a Blood Test on Blood Pressure, 16 J. HUM. HYPERTENSION 621, 621 (2002) (“It was
concluded that anticipation of a blood test affects measured systolic blood pressure in
volunteers.”).
77. To be fair, this is not a problem unique to studies of placebo effects. It applies to some
extent to studies of any medical treatment.
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patients do not have conscious control over physiological placebo
effects as they do over behavioral ones.
C. Nocebo Effects
At the beginning of Part I, I defined placebo effects quite
generally as a change in health outcomes following treatment that is
due to a patient’s expectation about the value of that treatment. One
ought, however, to be more precise about what a placebo effect is.
Whereas, in the common view, placebo effects typically improve
78
health, the regulatory implications of these effects often focuses on
cases in which expectations worsen health. Therefore, let me refine
the definition of placebo effects to be the positive health effect of
79
positive expectations about a therapy and introduce three other
concepts. The first is a nocebo effect, which I define as a negative
80
health effect of negative expectations about a therapy (or product).
The second is an inverse nocebo effect, which I define as a positive
health effect from negative expectations about a therapy. The third is
an inverse placebo effect, which I define as a negative health effect
from positive expectations about a therapy. The relationship between
these terms is illustrated in Table 1. Placebo-related effects flow from
positive expectations and nocebo-related effects from negative
expectations about a therapy (or product). To give these definitions
greater salience, let me use an illustration.
Recall the Malani study of the effect of changing the probability
of treatment in statin trials on health outcomes among subjects in
81
those trials. Its main finding was that patients in higher probability
trials, because they believed they were more likely to be receiving
active treatment rather than placebo, had on average lower LDL
82
levels. This is a positive placebo effect because higher LDL levels
83
increase the risk of stroke and heart failure. Interestingly, although
this effect was found when trials for all statins were lumped together,

78. See Malani, supra note 2, at 236 (“A medical treatment is said to have placebo effects if
patients who are optimistic about the treatment respond better to the treatment.”).
79. See id.
80. See id. at 253 (describing the “‘nocebo’ or negative placebo effect”); see also Robert A.
Hahn, The Nocebo Phenomenon: Scope and Foundations, in THE PLACEBO EFFECT 56, 56
(Anne Harrington ed., 2000) (“The nocebo hypothesis proposes that expectations of sickness
and the affective states associated with such expectations cause sickness in the expectant.”).
81. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
82. See Malani, supra note 2, at 249.
83. See id. at 244.
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it was not found when trials of different types of statins were
84
evaluated separately. For lovastatin (sold as Mevacor) and
pravastatin (Pravachol), subjects in higher-probability trials actually
had LDL levels that were 5.5 and 1.5 mg/dll higher, respectively, than
85
subjects in lower-probability trials. This is an inverse placebo effect:
higher expectations actually worsen outcomes.
What might cause positive or inverse placebo effects? If placebo
effects are a behavioral phenomenon, it is not hard to predict the
mechanism behind such effects. Patients on statins may either take
actions that complement their therapies—such as reduce their intake
of fatty foods or exercise with greater frequency—or view statins
prescriptions as licenses to eat more fatty foods or lapse on their
exercise regimens. If treatment elicits complementary behavior,
treatment would appear to trigger positive placebo effects. If
treatment caused a substitution away from self-control behaviors,
then treatment would appear to trigger inverse placebo effects. In this
view, the inverse placebo effect is a synonym for moral hazard (in the
economics literature), risk compensation (in psychology), or
86
disinhibition (in public health). If placebo effects are a physiological
phenomenon, one might speculate about a mechanism similar to the
one in the behavioral model: the body responds to treatment by
allocating more resources (hormones, blood flow, immune system
resources, and so on) to the ailment—a complementary response and
thus positive placebo effect—or by reallocating these resources to
other problems—a substitution response and thus negative placebo
effect. The difficulty in the physiological placebo effect case is that
not enough is understood about the relationship between the central
nervous system and the vascular, immune, and other “subconscious”
systems to have any confidence in speculation.
A second interesting finding in the Malani study is that patients
in higher probability trials also reported the usual side effects
87
associated with statins with greater frequency. As Figure 2 in this

84. See id. at 253 (“Although the top two statins by market size, Lipitor and Zocor,
generate positive placebo effects roughly 30 percent the size of pharmacological effects of these
drugs, other statins, Pravachol and Mevacor, generate negative expectation effects between 3
percent and 9 percent the size of pharmacological effects.”).
85. See id. (“[W]ith Pravachol and Mevacor, patients expected a greater reduction in LDL
in probability one trials relative to probability 0.5 trials, but they got a lower reduction in
LDL.”).
86. See id.
87. Id. at 249.
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Article documents, side effects increased by 50 to 64 percent. This
result is a nocebo effect because expectation of side effects from
statins (which were elevated as the probability of receiving a statin
88
rose) increased actual side effects from statins. The Malani study is
not the only one to document a nocebo effect. Myers, Cairns, and
Singer examined gastrointestinal side effects in a multicenter trial of
89
aspirin or sulfinpyrazone in the treatment of unstable angina. After
independent ethical review of the consent form at each of the study
sites, this study’s consent forms specifically mentioned
90
gastrointestinal side effects in two sites but not a third. Moreover,
the form at the third site stated simply that active treatment is “well91
tolerated” by patients. As the reader might anticipate, the
investigators found that subjects enrolled at the first two sites
reported 28 percent higher rates of minor gastrointestinal side
92
effects.
There were no significant differences in major
93
gastrointestinal side effects. But the minor side effects were
94
important enough to raise dropout rates at the first two sites. The
investigators concluded that specific mention of certain side effects
95
raised expectations of, and thus incidence of, those side effects.
Unfortunately, no intuitive or serious theories explain the etiology of
these effects.
D. Triggers for Placebo Effects
It should be apparent from the studies I have described that the
sort of expectations that alter health outcomes can be triggered by a
range of stimuli. The most common is the suggestion of efficacy or
side effects by an expert such as the research investigator, who is in a
form of doctor-patient relationship with subjects. The pain studies
and Myers, Cairns, and Singer’s gastrointestinal-side-effect study
provide examples.

88. See id.
89. Martin G. Myers, John A. Cairns & Joel Singer, The Consent Form as a Possible Cause
of Side Effects, 42 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 250, 250 (1987). Angina is
chest pain due to the lack of blood flow and thus oxygen to the heart muscle. See M. GABRIEL
KHAN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HEART DISEASE 569 (2006).
90. Myers et al., supra note 89, at 250–51.
91. Id. at 251.
92. See id. at 252 tbl.2.
93. Id. at 250–52.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 250, 252.
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A second stimulus is the expected value of treatment, which is
the sum of every possible outcome weighted by the probability of that
96
outcome. Evidence for the role of probabilities is provided by the
97
98
Malani and the Malani and Houser studies, both of which
99
employed those probabilities to manipulate expectations, and by
100
Pollo et al., which found that placebo effects under random
assignment to active treatment or placebo were roughly half the
101
placebo effects under (deceptive) assignment to active treatment.
Evidence for the role of every possible outcome may be found in
Skovlund, which summarizes two studies of the pain killer
102
paracetamol for postpartum pain—that is, pain following childbirth.
In those studies, Skovlund found that subjects in trials in which the
control was an active medication (naproxen) reported lower levels of
pain than subjects in trials in which their control was placebo. She
concluded that the possibility of obtaining naproxen rather than
placebo elevated even the outcomes of subjects who ultimately
received paracetamol.
A fascinating study by Shiv, Carmon, and Ariely in the
marketing literature provides evidence of at least two other possible
103
stimuli: the price of a product and advertising about the product. In
a series of experiments, these investigators examined the effect of an
energy drink on mental acuity, as measured by the number of puzzles
104
that subjects could solve in thirty minutes.
Subjects were
randomized across two sets of treatments. In the first set, although all
subjects were asked to pay for their energy drink, half were given a
96. See Mark S. Roberts & Frank A. Sonnenberg, Decision Modeling Techniques, in
DECISION MAKING IN HEALTH CARE 20, 27 (Gretchen B. Chapman & Frank A. Sonnenberg
eds., 2000) (“The expected value of CHOICE 1 is simply the sum of the possible outcomes of
that choice weighted by the probabilities of each outcome . . . .”).
97. Malani, supra note 2, at 236–56.
98. Malani & Houser, supra note 70 (manuscript at 9, 11).
99. See supra notes 36, 73–74 and accompanying text.
100. Pollo et al., supra note 8, at 77–84.
101. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
102. See Skovlund, supra note 7, at 1041 (citing E. Skovlund et al., Comparison of
Postpartum Pain Treatments Using a Sequential Trial Design I. Paracetamol Versus Placebo, 40
EUR. J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 343, 343–47 (1991) [hereinafter Skovlund et al., Trial
Design Part I]; E. Skovlund et al., Comparison of Postpartum Pain Treatments Using a
Sequential Trial Design II. Naproxen Versus Paracetamol, 40 EUR. J. CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY 539, 539–42 (1991) [hereinafter Skovlund et al., Trial Design Part II]).
103. Baba Shiv, Ziv Carmon & Dan Ariely, Placebo Effects of Marketing Actions:
Consumers May Get What They Pay For, 42 J. MARKETING RES. 383, 391–92 (2005).
104. Id. at 386.
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discount price (and told this). In the second set, half of the subjects
were given positive advertising about the efficacy of the energy drink.
The investigators found that subjects who paid a higher price for the
105
energy drink solved 1.6–2.7 (or nearly 40 percent) more puzzles.
This can be verified by comparing the black versus white bars in
106
Figure 4. They also found that subjects exposed to advertising
solved 3.2–4.3 (or roughly 75 percent) more puzzles. Comparing the
high expectancy condition (with advertising) to the low expectancy
(no advertising) condition in Figure 4 verifies this result.
Another interesting finding from the Shiv, Carmon, and Ariely
study is that individuals who had previously consumed the energy
drink used in their study experienced more significant positive
107
placebo effects. This result is in line with the prior literature
suggesting that placebo effects may be a conditioned response.
Although some commentators suggest that conditioning—or
experience—is just another way of generating expectations about a
108
treatment, the more important point is that experience, like
suggestion from authority, can generate the expectations that drive
placebo effects.
An important possible stimulus, but one that has not yet been
documented, is dosage. I suspect that patients tend to believe that
drugs are more effective at higher doses. If correct, then I predict that
offering patients larger doses of an active treatment or pills that are
padded with placebo filler to make them appear larger may generate
positive placebo effects. The danger with simply increasing active
dosage is that higher doses of an active therapy could also amplify
side effects. For drug labeling and practice guidelines, it is necessary
to know more about placebo effects of dosage.
Beyond evidence about specific types of stimulus for placebo
effects, it would be helpful—from a practical perspective—to know
the answer to three other questions about the preconditions for or
dynamics of placebo effects. The foremost is whether a treatment
must have a positive pharmacological effect to generate a placebo
effect. A good deal of prior research—such as the pain studies

105. Id. at 390.
106. This figure reproduces Figure 4 from the study. See id. at 390 fig.4.
107. Id. at 387.
108. See, e.g., Sibylle Klosterhalfen & Paul Enck, Psychobiology of the Placebo Response,
125 AUTONOMIC NEUROSCIENCE: BASIC & CLINICAL 94, 96 fig.4 (2006) (highlighting that
conditioning may alter expectations).
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109

described earlier —has suggested that the answer is no. Researchers
have repeatedly been able to use suggestion to generate pain relief or
110
modification in blood pressure following consumption of inert pills.
Suggestion in the clinical trial setting is a far cry from suggestion by a
111
doctor.
And if the placebo effects from treatments without
pharmacological action are limited or zero, then the cost of ignoring
placebo effect in, for example, drug regulation is also limited.
Second, does telling subjects about placebo effects alter those
effects? The most informative study on this topic is Shiv, Carmon,
and Ariely’s study. When the investigators drew subjects’ attention to
the placebo effect by directly asking subjects whether price—or more
precisely the discount—conveyed information about quality of the
112
energy drink, the placebo effect disappeared. This result does not
demonstrate that placebo effects only occur when patients do not
think about them, but it does tend to support that conclusion.
Presumably telling subjects about placebo effects direct their
attention to why they think a treatment will be effective; in Shiv,
Carmon, and Ariely’s study this direction diminishes the placebo
113
effect. More research is needed in this area because of its relevance
to the debate over informed consent for the provision of placebo
therapies.
A third question that has policy relevance is whether the sort of
beliefs about drug efficacy that generate placebo effects change
significantly over time. One reason to suspect this change is that
patients, perhaps through their doctors or their own investigations,
are continuously being exposed to new research and anecdotes about
medications they take or the alternatives to medications they take,
which may modify their expectations about these medications. These

109. See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., S.B. Penick & Lawrence E. Hinkle, The Effect of Expectation on Response to
Phenmetrazine, 26 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 369, 369–74 (1964).
111. Further evidence comes from the casual observation that many complementary and
alternative medications (CAMs), such as echinacea, have very large markets despite limited
evidence that these medications have pharmacological effects. See Franklin et al., supra note 14,
at 600 (“It is estimated that between 29% and 42% of adults in the United States use 1 or more
CAM treatments during a year.”). Perhaps consumers nevertheless persist in buying these
medications for their placebo effects. The problem with this logic is that studies of CAMs fail to
rule out the possibility that although the average consumer experiences no positive
pharmacological response to a medication, a subpopulation does, and it is this subpopulation
that repeatedly purchases that medication.
112. See Shiv et al., supra note 103, at 388–89.
113. Id. at 389.
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changes may be reflected in patients’ responses to treatment. Of
particular concern is that patients appear to be quite optimistic about
new drugs; then, as clinical trials reveal that the drug is not a panacea,
expectations decline. This possibility creates the risk that drugs that
have strong placebo effects early on will have lower placebo effects
down the road. Another concern is that well-publicized anecdotes or
even litigation about the side effects of a drug may increase the
incidence of nocebo effects from the drug. There is simply no
research that sheds light on this issue.
II. REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS OF PLACEBO EFFECTS
The methodological limitations of many placebo effect studies
discussed at the start of Part I and the outstanding but important
research questions identified throughout that Part suggest it might be
premature to conclude that placebo effects require particular legal
reforms. Nevertheless, I believe it is appropriate to begin discussing
how placebo effects might impact legal regulation in a host of fields,
ranging from drug law to tort law.
As a threshold matter, the sheer quantity of studies finding
evidence consistent with such placebo effects makes it hard to deny
they exist. The existence of placebo effects is merely a necessary
reason to justify speculation about the legal relevance of this
phenomenon. One sufficient reason is that an understanding of the
policy and legal implications of placebo effects will help guide future
research on placebo effects to ensure the research has maximum
practical impact. Highlighting potential policy impacts will guide
researchers to questions, such as whether beliefs that generate
placebo effects or the effects themselves can be controlled by
subjects, and to methodological improvements, especially to external
validity, that will make the research more useful for the future
discussion of policy impacts. Another sufficient reason to begin
discussing placebo effects is that these effects have both complex and
perhaps profound implications for traditional models of regulation.
Those models emphasize physical causes of injury in a way best
characterized by the adage: sticks and stones may break my bones but
words never hurt me. Placebo effects suggest that words (more
precisely, their effect on expectations) can hurt me. But there may be
important side effects to regulating words, and the optimal degree of
regulation is not obvious. It will take time to resolve these issues and
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the sooner they enter the public debate, the sooner they can be
resolved.
A. Drug Law
The area of law most obviously impacted by placebo effects is
drug law. And the most important drug law reform suggested by the
evidence of placebo effects is that the FDA should consider these
114
effects in making drug approval decisions.
1. Correcting Bias from Placebo Effects. But before turning to
that bold proposition, I offer a more modest suggestion. Even if the
FDA continues only to consider pharmacological effects in deciding
whether to allow a drug to be marketed, it should consider placebo
effects and nocebo effects in the course of determining
115
pharmacological efficacy and safety, respectively. The reason is that
placebo and nocebo effects may interact with pharmacological effects
such that the gold standard of evidence for efficacy—the randomized
controlled trial—incorrectly estimates pharmacological effects.
The Malani 2006 study provides an illustration. Recall that the
study treated differences in the probability of treatment in different
116
trials as manipulations of subjects’ expectations. Interestingly,
regression analysis of results from ulcer trials revealed that rates of
healing rose with the probability of treatment in arms given active
treatment (H2-blockers and PPIs) but not in arms given placebo
117
control. Figure 5 plots the results assuming linear placebo effects.

114. The FDA drug approval process for most drugs has two basic steps. After a drug
company has completed in vitro and animal tests on a chemical entity, the company files an
Investigational New Drug (IND) application to obtain the right to test the drug on humans. 21
U.S.C. § 355(i) (2006). These clinical tests have three phases. Phase I tests study a few normal
subjects to determine the toxicity of different dosages of the drug. Phase II tests involve only
sick subjects and large sample sizes to determine if the drug demonstrates some efficacy. Phase
III tests involve even larger samples of sick subjects and are typically randomized controlled
trials. Their goal is to provide compelling statistical evidence on both safety and efficacy. After
these studies are completed, the company submits a New Drug Application (NDA). Id. §
355(b)(1). The FDA must determine if the drug is safe and whether there is “substantial
evidence” of efficacy before it can approve the drug for marketing. Id. § 355(d). In many cases
the FDA can approve the drug subject to further so-called Phase IV studies of the drug’s safety
profile after marketing has begun.
115. For a discussion of how the FDA might do this with only a slight tweak of the existing
approval process, see infra Part II.A.4.
116. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
117. The regression analysis includes not just trials with probabilities 0.5 and 1 but also trials
with other probabilities of treatment. See Malani, supra note 2, at 251 & n.14.
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The y-axis gives the benefits in terms of the fraction of subjects who
were healed. (For simplicity, I have normalized the pharmacological
effect of placebo to zero.) The x-axis gives the probability of
treatment. The lower solid line projects outcomes in the placebo
control arm of a trial as the probability of treatment rises. The upper
solid line projects outcomes in the H2-blocker arms. According to the
regression analysis, the lower line is flat and the upper line is rising.
If a new drug application for an average H2-blocker were only to
include results from placebo controlled trials in which half of subjects
were treated, then it would overestimate the pharmacological efficacy
of the drug. To see this, initially note that the outcome in the H2blocker arm of a half-treated trial is roughly 31 percent. This includes
the pharmacological effect, which is the difference between the upper
and lower lines at probability zero, that is, where expectation is
playing no role. It also includes half the roughly 26 percent placebo
118
effects estimated in H2-blocker arms. The reason is that subjects
only think there is a half probability of treatment and thus experience
only half the full expectation effect of treatment. Next, consider that
pharmacological effects are ordinarily estimated by taking the
difference between outcomes in the treatment arm and the placebocontrol arm. If the placebo effect altered outcomes in the placebocontrol arm the same as in H2-blocker arms, then the placebo effect
from the H2-blocker arm and the placebo effect from the placebocontrol arm would cancel. This is illustrated by the dotted line in
Figure 5. The problem is that the placebo effect does not actually
alter the efficacy of the placebo control. Therefore, as the probability
of treatment increases, one’s estimate of pharmacological effects
rises. In half-treated trials, this relationship means that instead of an
outcome of 13 percent in placebo control arms, one observes an
outcome of 0 percent. This leads one to estimate pharmacological
effects of 31 percent (31 percent minus 0 percent) rather than the
correct amount of 18 percent (31 percent minus 13 percent).
Two caveats are in order. First, the bias from the failure to
account for placebo effects when estimating pharmacological efficacy
is not always positive. In contexts other than H2-blocker versus
placebo trials, it might be that placebo effects raise outcomes in the
control arm more than they raise outcomes in the treatment arm.

118. The 31 percent and 26 percent numbers are estimated by averaging over the four H2blockers listed in Table 6 of my study, which employs 50 percent placebo-controlled trials to
estimate pharmacological effects. Id. at 252 tbl.6.
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Indeed, this would be the case, for example, if one were conducting a
119
noninferiority trial in which the treatment was PPI and the control
was an H2-blocker. The former has a placebo effect of roughly 1.5
percent, whereas the latter has a placebo effect of 26 percent. Thus
the relative pharmacological effect of PPIs is underestimated by
120
roughly 12.25 percent (0.75 percent minus 13 percent). Second,
when there are nocebo effects and those effects are not symmetric
across treatment and control arms, the bias from expectation effects
also biases estimates of side effects from drugs. Unless the
expectation bias in estimates of side effects is exactly the same as
expectation bias in estimates of pharmacological efficacy, the FDA
cannot simply ignore these effects on the assumption that they cancel
when the agency balances efficacy with safety in judging a new drug
application.
Expectation bias is not a concern when a drug clearly has large
pharmacological effects and small placebo and nocebo effects. In this
case, accounting for the expectation bias would not alter the FDA’s
judgment. If, however, the expectation effects are large, then the
FDA may be rejecting drugs it should approve and approving drugs it
should reject. (As an example, consider the hypothetical in which the
pharmacological effect of H2-blockers was zero but the placebo effect
remained 13 percent. The FDA would incorrectly approve H2blockers for ulcers.) That is a serious concern even under the existing
standard for drug review.
2. Crediting Nocebo and Placebo Effects when Judging Safety and
Efficacy. Matters only become more complicated when one considers
the more radical claim that the FDA ought to consider both placebo
and nocebo effects—not just pharmacological effects—when
determining whether to approve the marketing of a new drug or
withdraw marketing approval for an existing drug. The proposition
relies on two assumptions: expectation effects are real and they
operate outside of the clinical trial context. Part I reviewed a number

119. A noninferiority trial is one in which a new treatment is compared to an existing
treatment. KENNETH ROCKWOOD & SERGE GAUTHIER, TRIAL DESIGNS AND OUTCOMES IN
DEMENTIA THERAPEUTIC RESEARCH 279 (2005). The goal is to show the new treatment is “not
inferior” to the conventional treatment, that is, does not have a statistically significant negative
treatment effect relative to the conventional treatment. Id.
120. The 1.5 percent number is estimated by averaging over the two PPIs listed in Table 6.
Malani, supra note 2, at 252 tbl.6.
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of studies that support the first assumption. But what evidence
supports the second?
One piece of evidence is that some of the studies—namely the
Malani (2006) and Malani and Houser studies—are externally valid,
that is, they can be extrapolated to cases outside the trial context.
Consider what happens, for instance, when patients consume a drug
outside the trial context. They actually consume two separate things.
One is the pharmacological effect of the drug. The other is an
expectation that, with certainty, they are consuming the drug. Now
consider my technique of manipulating the probability of treatment in
121
a trial to estimate placebo effects. This technique estimates the full
placebo effect by projecting the change in outcomes when going from
a trial in which 0 percent of subjects are treated to one in which 100
percent are treated. The motivation is that being in a 100 percent trial
in which you are certain you are consuming the drug is like
consuming the drug with certainty outside the trial context. If the
analogy is correct, my findings are externally valid: they suggest that
ulcer medications, statins, and caffeine have placebo effects in the
real world.
Another piece of evidence that placebo effects operate in
nonexperimental settings is somewhat indirect. Given research
suggesting that alternative medications such as echinacea have no
122
pharmacological effects (and ignoring that the results might be
biased because of placebo effects in the trial setting), it would be hard
to explain the magnitude of the market for these alternative
medications (estimated at $36–47 billion in 1997, with echinacea the
123
most frequently used alternative medication ) without recourse to
real-world placebo effects.
Even under a liberal interpretation of these data points, it is
reasonable to remain skeptical of the claim that placebo effects

121. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., James A. Taylor et al., Efficacy and Safety of Echinacea in Treating Upper
Respiratory Tract Infections in Children: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 290 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 2824, 2829 (2003) (finding echinacea ineffective in treating upper respiratory tract
infection symptoms in young children); Ronald B. Turner et al., An Evaluation of Echinacea
angustifolia in Experimental Rhinovirus Infections, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 341, 347 (2005)
(concluding that extracts of Echinacea augustifolia do not have clinically significant effects on
rhinovirus infection or disease).
123. See PATRICIA M. BARNES ET AL., COMPLEMENTARY AND ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE
USE AMONG ADULTS: UNITED STATES, 2002, at 1, 9 (Nat’l Ctr. for Health Statistics, Advance
Data Report No. 343, 2004), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ad/ad343.pdf.
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operate outside the trial context. This skepticism suggests a priority
for future research. In the interim, however, I shall assume for the
purpose of discussion that expectations alter outcomes in
nonacademic settings. How exactly, then, should the FDA modify the
manner in which it approves drugs?
The answer depends on whether informing people that a drug
operates through expectation effects (“placebo instructions” for
short) disables those effects. Suppose it does not. Then the FDA can
simply treat placebo and nocebo effects the same way it treats
pharmacological effects. When deciding whether a drug is effective,
the FDA should consider the sum of positive pharmacological effects
and placebo effects. When determining the side effects from a drug, it
should consider the sum of pharmacological side effects and nocebo
124
effects. These expectations would naturally take their proper role in
the agency’s balancing of efficacy and safety risk when judging
125
drugs.
What is the appropriate reform if, however, placebo instructions
do defuse expectation effects? In this case, the FDA’s decision to
approve a drug would depend on its regulations concerning drug
126
labeling following approval
because the latter affects the
127
expectation effects from a drug. Moreover, the proper reform would
depend on whether the expectation effect at issue is positive or
negative. Because positive placebo effects are good, one would not

124. This approach likely would not require a legislative change. The Food, Drug and
Cosmetics Act requires proof of “safety” and “efficacy.” 21 U.S.C. § 321(p)(2) (2006). It does
not define those terms. (Nor does the legislative history. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 87-1744, at 16
(1962).) The FDA could use its Chevron discretion to interpret those terms to include
expectation-driven effects. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843 (1984).
125. See David F. Cavers, The Legal Control of the Clinical Investigation of Drugs: Some
Political, Economic, and Social Questions, 98 DAEDALUS 427, 429–30 (1969) (describing the
FDA’s balancing of efficacy and safety risk during drug evaluations).
126. See Richard A. Merrill, Compensation for Prescription Drug Injuries, 59 VA. L. REV. 1,
11 (1973) (“The FDA not only decides whether a drug may be marketed, it also determines how
it may be promoted and sold. The agency approves, and for practical purposes prescribes, the
labeling that the drug must bear.”).
127. One might quibble that no one reads labels. But that actually simplifies matters
because then the FDA can simply assume that labeling will not diffuse placebo effects. The real
problem is that the truth is probably somewhere in between; that is, some consumers read
labels, but others do not. In this case, the government would want to consider omitting positive
expectation effects and advertising—not merely labeling but actually broadcasting—negative
expectation effects.
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want labeling to defuse them. Because nocebo and negative placebo
effects are bad, however, it would be useful if labeling defused them.
The common sense reform this difference suggests is that the
FDA should consider positive placebo effects in drug approval
decisions but not distinguish positive placebo and pharmacological
effects in labeling. Conversely, the FDA should not consider nocebo
effects and negative placebo effects in drug approval, but should
highlight that drugs have these effects in labeling. These
recommendations do not qualitatively change if placebo instructions
only partly diffuse expectation effects. The damage from labels that
highlight positive expectation effects and the benefits from those that
highlight negative expectation effects are proportional to the extent
of diffusion.
This asymmetric approach presents two difficulties. First,
perhaps consumers are hyperrational and hypersensitive about
placebo effects. Even if the FDA does not tell them which drugs have
positive placebo effects, they know the FDA credits those effects
when approving drugs. This knowledge may be sufficient to disable
128
positive placebo effects for drugs that have them. One response is to
offer a “Track B” for drug approval. Track B would operate much as
the Food and Drug Act did before its 1962 reform: the FDA would
129
review drugs for safety but not efficacy. (The existing Track A
would require both proof of safety and efficacy.) A Track B approach
is unlikely to renew placebo effects, however, if consumers are
hypersensitive, not only to specific placebo instructions, but also the
general possibility that a drug may have placebo effects. These
consumers would infer that a drug company that sought approval
under Track B did so because its drug had placebo effects. They
therefore would not experience the positive placebo effects from that
Track B–approved drug.
Although the prospect that the FDA can never consider placebo
effects without disabling them is dismaying, the prospect is not very

128. It does not necessarily reduce the efficacy of drugs that do not have placebo effects
unless that knowledge of a chance of placebo effects counteracts even pharmacological effects.
There is no research that supports (or contradicts) this possibility. But it does seem contrary to
the common sense of placebo instructions.
129. See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 102(a)–(c), 76 Stat. 780, 781
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(p)(1)–(2), 355(b)(1)(A) (2006)). See generally Note,
Drug Efficacy and the 1962 Drug Amendments, 60 GEO. L.J. 185 (1971) (tracing the
development and assessing the performance of the drug efficacy requirements in the Drug
Amendments of 1962).
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likely. A form of Track B approval already exists. If a company does
not make specific claims about the therapeutic value of its treatment
(and its product is not otherwise a controlled substance), then it does
130
not have to seek FDA approval. Not applying for approval is the
131
track that, for example, the product “Airborne” pursued, as did
numerous alternative medications such as echinacea. Yet those
132
products have a sizable consumer base. There is reason (given
133
earlier) to suspect the treatments operate partly through placebo
effects. If these placebo effects were not disabled when their
manufacturers refused to seek FDA approval, they are unlikely to be
disabled by the fact that, in general, the FDA considers placebo
134
effects in approval decisions. Little evidence exists showing the
effect of placebo instruction generally, and no evidence suggests that
the possibility of placebo effects disables these effects. Finally, it
might be quite reasonable to assume that consumers have too much
else on their minds to notice that the FDA considers placebo effects
in making approval decisions. In other words, bounded rationality
might actually assist the placebo effect.
The second problem with the FDA considering positive placebo
effects in its approval decisions is that it seems odd—or at least
politically suspect—to have a decision rule that appears biased
toward favorable conclusions about new drug applications. By
considering positive effects but ignoring negative effects, the FDA
appears to have a thumb (or an even heavier thumb) on the scale in
favor of drug companies. But this view fails to understand the
fundamental shift in the role of the FDA in the context of placebo
effects. The FDA regulates marketing, and placebo effects imply that
marketing affects treatment outcomes. Therefore the FDA is no
longer merely an impartial judge of drugs, but rather partly a health
care provider just like the doctor who prescribes a drug. In this role,
130. See PETER BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A. MERRILL & LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, FOOD
477 (3d ed. 2007).
131. Although Airborne avoided having to file a new drug application with the FDA, it was
subject to a false advertising suit that it settled. See Airborne® Settlement, http://www.
airbornehealthsettlement.com/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2008).
132. Kerry Fehr-Snyder, Herbal Cold Remedy Goes Airborne After Oprah Plug, ARIZ.
REPUBLIC, Feb. 1, 2005, at E1.
133. See text accompanying supra note 124.
134. One distinction between treatments for which FDA approval is not sought and those
for which Track B might be sought is that the costs of the former are so high that consumers
think it is rational that companies do not seek approval for drugs with positive pharmacological
effects. There would also be a cost difference between Track B and Track A.

AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
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the FDA ought to take actions to ensure that the drug is as beneficial
to the patient as possible. Doing so does not require exaggerating the
drug’s efficacy, but may justify nondisclosure of how the drug works.
It may also justify not merely approving drugs despite nocebo effects
but also attempting to eliminate those effects by informing people
135
those effects are just in their heads.
3. The Case of Pure Placebo Therapies. Whether or not patients
are sensitive to placebo instructions, and thus whether or not the
FDA ought to take an asymmetric approach to weighing expectation
effects in drug approval, a natural source of concern will be whether
the FDA ought to approve drugs with no pharmacological effects but
with a positive placebo effect. In other words, should the FDA
approve pure placebo therapies? Before answering this question, one
may query whether inert substances can even have placebo effects.
The evidence on this is limited and mixed. My meta-analysis of ulcer
trials finds that outcomes in the placebo control arms of these trials
136
did not rise with the probability of treatment. This finding suggests
pure placebos do not have placebo effects. The study, however, is not
conclusive. First, even though it found evidence of placebo effects in
137
the treatment arms of ulcer trials,
my design tended to
underestimate placebo effects in all the arms. For instance, subjects in
low-probability trials may have sought treatment outside the context
of the experiment. Their extra treatment would have exaggerated
outcomes in low-probability trials and thus reduce the difference

135. Eliminating nocebo effects by educating consumers may be easier said than done.
Different people may have different levels of sensitivity to placebo instructions. If the FDA
discounts nocebo effects but warns that side effects are really nocebo effects in drug labeling,
the warning may benefit consumers who are sensitive to such instructions but harm those who
are not. Those who are insensitive to instructions will experience nocebo effects. This issue of
differing consumer responses is not like ordinary problems of heterogeneity in treatment
effects. If a drug has different effects on different people, the FDA can approve the drug and let
doctors determine for whom the drug is appropriate. With labeling, however, all patients get the
same treatment. Alternatively, the FDA could require doctors to warn patients who are
insensitive to instruction that they will experience the nocebo effects or not to prescribe those
drugs with such effects. Whether this strategy is feasible depends on whether doctors can
distinguish sensitive and insensitive patients. Given the FDA’s current approach to ordinary
treatment heterogeneity, it appears the agency does not have much faith in doctors. See Anup
Malani & Feifang Hu, The Option Value of New Therapeutics 14 (May 30, 2005) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Duke Law Journal).
136. See supra text accompanying note 118.
137. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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between outcomes in high- and low-probability arms. Therefore, it
is possible that the design simply missed the placebo effects in the
placebo control arm. Second, even though pure placebos might not be
able to heal ulcers, they may be able to ameliorate other ailments. For
example, all the pain studies in Part I generated analgesic effects from
pure placebos. True, studies such as Pollo et al.’s employ somewhat
139
subjective measures of pain relief, but others employ naloxone or
brain scans to demonstrate at least physiological correlates, if not
140
proof, of pain reduction. At most one can say, then, that it is
uncertain whether a drug must have a pharmacological effect to
generate placebo effects.
For the sake of thoroughness, I should explore the consequences
if pure placebos can have placebo effects. The economist Russell
Sobel argues that the FDA ought to approve pure placebos for the
141
simple reason that they have positive therapeutic value. In his favor,
one might argue that there is no theoretical difference between a drug
with both pharmacological and placebo effects and a drug with just
placebo effects, especially if placebo effects operate through
physiological channels. Why should the FDA privilege one causal
pathway over another, especially when it often cannot even identify
the causal pathway of pharmacologically active drugs and is willing to
separately approve mixtures or combinations of pharmacologically
142
active therapies? But before embracing Sobel’s proposal, it is
reasonable to ask whether a change is necessary. The existing system
may not allow pure placebo manufacturers to make precise medical
claims, but it may allow them to make nonspecific claims about health
143
promotion without getting FDA approval. The FDA also has

138. Thus my design suffered the same methodological flaw as Hróbjartsson and Gøtzsche.
See supra note 9. Both studies were subject to false negatives. Therefore, Hróbjartsson and
Gøtzsche’s negative finding, like my negative finding in the placebo arm of ulcer trials, does not
disprove the existence of placebo effects. And my positive finding in treatment arms provides
strong support, indeed a lower bound, for placebo effects.
139. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 52–69.
141. See Sobel, supra note 1, at 465.
142. For example, in 1997 the FDA approved Combivir, a mixture of the reverse
transcriptase inhibitors zidovudine (AZT) and lamivudine (3TC), even though each component
had been separately approved years earlier. John Henkel, Attacking AIDS with a ‘Cocktail’
Therapy: Drug Combo Sends Deaths Plummeting, FDA CONSUMER, July/Aug. 1999, at 12, 14,
available at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/1999/499_aids.html.
143. See, e.g., United States. v. Nutri-Cology, Inc., No. C-91-1332 DLJ, 1993 WL 13585505,
at *8–11 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 1993) (holding that promotional claims alone do not determine
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discretion not to regulate a placebo because it poses no medical
144
risk. And the market for nonapproved drugs, mainly the market for
alternative medicines, is quite large—on the order of tens of billions
145
of dollars. Unless consumers are being misled even on repeat
purchases of therapies like echinacea, this is a lower bound on the
value of placebo effects generated from pure placebos under current
law. Nevertheless, Sobel argues that the 1962 Kefauver-Harris
Amendments to the Food Drug and Cosmetics Act, which the FDA
has interpreted to require that manufacturers demonstrate their drugs
are pharmacologically effective, led to removals of several hundred
146
pure placebos from the marketplace. The problem is that Sobel
147
does not quantify the value of these banned drugs.
4. Open Research Questions and Recommendations for Reform.
Where does that leave us? There are two important research
questions that must be answered before one can convincingly argue
for equal treatment of pure placebos and pharmacologically active
drugs with placebo effects. The first follows from the discussion from
the discussion in Section A.3: can vague statements about the health
benefits of a pure placebo generate the same placebo effects as
specific instructions about a pure placebo’s medical consequences? If
so, then the FDA’s benign neglect policy toward alternative
medicines may be a reasonable compromise. The second question
addresses the implicit assumption behind the discomfort with FDA
approval of pure placebos: are there hidden, incremental costs to
encouraging placebo effects with pure placebo therapies? For

whether a product constitutes a drug that the FDA can regulate pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §
321(g)(1)(B)). Airborne, for example, claims it helps prevent colds, but is not regulated as a
drug by the FDA. It is helpful that it contains a disclaimer that its claims were not evaluated by
the FDA. See Airborne Health: Terms and Conditions, http://www.airbornehealth.com/tc.php
(last visited Oct. 24, 2008); see also Nutri-Cology, 1993 WL 13585505, at *10, *8–10 (holding that
standard disclaimers “can be considered along with other evidence of the product’s intended
use”).
144. See, e.g., Nat’l Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. Mathews, 557 F.2d 325, 334–35 (2d Cir. 1977).
145. See supra text accompanying note 123.
146. See Sobel, supra note 1, at 471–72. The drugs to which he refers are pharmacologically
ineffective for their marketed purpose but not necessarily inert “sugar” pills.
147. It is not obviously an argument against approval of pure placebos that whatever these
pure placebos can achieve, pharmacologically active drugs can achieve as well or better. No
evidence shows that patients always get a larger overall effect—pharmacological plus placebo
effects—with a pharmacologically active alternative to a pure placebo with only a placebo
effect. Even if that were the case, no active drug substitutes for a given pure placebo may exist,
or the active drug substitute may have a more serious risk of side effects.
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example, will they divert consumers from active drugs, or generally
148
shake faith in nonplacebo medicines? Do they yield otherwise
suboptimal health-related behaviors or misallocation of the body’s
physiological resources? With little empirical research on these topics
available, any answer to these questions is pure conjecture.
Even if one were to solve the problem of whether to approve
pure placebos, the challenge of actually estimating placebo and
nocebo effects would remain. How could the FDA estimate these
effects? One approach is to piggyback on existing regulations that
require drug companies, in ordinary cases, to conduct two Phase III
149
clinical trials. The FDA by regulation could require that the two
trials have different probabilities of treatment and extrapolate the
expectation effects from the change in outcomes due to the change in
treatment probability. A second approach would be to permit or
require drug companies to submit observational studies or unblinded
experimental studies (on top of blinded experimental studies) to
support their new drug applications. The difference between
observational and unblinded experimental studies is that the former
do not randomly assign subjects to treatment. Both, however, are
unblinded. The advantage of not blinding subjects is that they
experience the full expectation effect of active treatment when they
are given active treatment. Therefore the difference between
outcomes in the treatment group and outcomes in the placebo control
group captures the pharmacological effects of treatment as well as the
full expectation effect of treatment. The disadvantage of either
varying the probability of treatment or unblinding is that the subjects
in the treatment group may not be the same as subjects in the control
150
group. I already described this flaw in my design. In observational
studies the problem is that different subjects choose the treatment
and control. In the unblinded experiments the subjects may differ
because certain members of the placebo control group drop out or
simultaneously seek conventional treatment outside the study. If the
differences between subjects across groups are not observed and
statistically controlled, they can introduce selection bias into
estimates of total effects. Because those that are or remain in the
placebo group have a higher rate of natural healing or seek alternate

148. John Thomas hypothesizes this may be so. See Thomas, supra note 1, at 343.
149. See HUTT ET AL., supra note 130, at 690–91 n.2.
150. See supra text accompanying note 138.
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therapy outside the study, the selection bias will probably cause the
151
FDA to underestimate placebo effects.
Before concluding this Section, let me draw attention to a topic
that is often an afterthought in drug regulation: postapproval
monitoring. The FDA has the authority to require continued (“Phase
IV”) studies of drug efficacy and safety even after a drug is approved
152
for marketing. The rationale is that these studies may inform the
153
agency about whether to revoke marketing approval. Postapproval
studies are even more important in the context of placebo effects
because these effects are triggered by expectations, which, unlike
pharmacological effects, may fluctuate over time. As the discussion in
Part I.D suggested, new research, news stories of side effects, and
even litigation might (in theory) modify the expectation effects of
drugs. If these effects are dramatic, the FDA may want to consider
withdrawing the drug. This claim is subject to the caveat that if
placebo instructions disable expectation effects, the proper response
to growing nocebo effects may be not be withdrawal; it may be
labeling that highlights, for example, that a surge in side effects is just
nocebo effects.
B. Health Law
This Section examines the implications of placebo effects for
three areas of health law: informed consent, fraud by doctors, and
medical malpractice. (Part II.C considers fraud by nondoctors.) But
before turning to these topics, the reader should note that there is one
area of health law that already considers, to a limited extent, the role
of placebo effects. Although it is rare, patients occasionally sue
doctors in contract on the theory that the doctor promised a certain
outcome from treatment but failed to deliver that outcome. Courts
impose higher standards of proof in these warranties-of-a-cure cases
than in cases in which patients simply allege that doctors promised a
treatment and did not provide that treatment. Warranties of a cure

151. See Anup Malani, Patient Enrollment in Medical Trials: Selection Bias in a Randomized
Experiment, 144 J. ECONOMETRICS 341, 341–42 (2008).
152. 21 U.S.C. § 355(k) (2006).
153. See Charles Steenburg, The Food and Drug Administration’s Use of Postmarketing
(Phase IV) Study Requirements: Exception to the Rule?, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 295, 300–33
(2006).
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154

must be explicit and precise. For example, they do not find
warranties when the doctor merely provides assurance that the
155
therapy will work or offers an (incorrect) prediction about the
156
Courts typically justify this stricter
outcome from treatment.
standard by arguing that doctors’ positive opinions may trigger
placebo effects in patients. They worry that a loose standard for
157
treatment warranties could hamper desirable effects. Courts view
this as a normal and perhaps even desirable state of affairs.
1. Informed Consent. The law of informed consent requires that
158
doctors disclose the material risks of their treatment strategy, as
159
well as alternatives to that strategy. Depending on the jurisdiction,
either the custom of doctors or the expectations and needs of patients
160
determine which risks are material. These requirements raise three
questions about the ability of doctors to manage expectation effects:
(1) If a doctor employs a pure placebo as therapy, must the doctor tell
the patient it is a placebo? (2) If a doctor chooses one therapy over
another because of placebo effects, and neither is a pure placebo,
must the doctor inform the patient that her choice was driven by
placebo effects? (3) Can a doctor avoid nocebo side effects by not
informing a patient of these side effects? The first question concerns
the duty to reveal the treatment, the second concerns the duty to
justify the treatment, and the third concerns the duty to describe the
risks of treatment. I now consider each case in turn.
154. Courts have required clear and convincing proof that the doctor promised a particular
outcome. See, e.g., Burns v. Wannamaker, 315 S.E.2d 179, 181 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984), aff’d and
modified 343 S.E.2d 27 (S.C. 1986) (per curiam). In some states, the Statute of Frauds requires
warranties of a cure to be in writing and signed. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-18-12-1 (2008)
(“Liability may not be imposed on a health care provider on the basis of an alleged breach of
contract . . . assuring results to be obtained from any procedure undertaken in the course of
health care, unless the contract is in writing and signed [by the provider] . . . .”); 40 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 1303.105 (West 2008) (“In the absence of a special contract in writing, a health
care provider is neither a warrantor nor a guarantor of a cure.”).
155. See Ferlito v. Cecola, 419 So. 2d 102, 105 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that a dentist’s
promise that crown work would make the patient’s teeth “pretty” did not constitute a
guarantee).
156. See Anglin v. Kleeman, 665 A.2d 747, 750 (N.H. 1995) (holding that a doctor’s
statement to a patient that, after knee surgery, his knee would be “stronger than . . . before” was
not a warranty (alteration in original) (quoting the lower court record)).
157. E.g., Sullivan v. O’Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183, 186 (Mass. 1973).
158. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 315–16 (2d ed. 2000).
159. Id. at 324.
160. E.g., MARK A. HALL, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI & DAVID ORENTLICHER, HEALTH
CARE LAW AND ETHICS 201 (6th ed. 2003).
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How informed consent should account for whether a doctor may
employ a pure placebo as therapy without disclosing this to a patient
depends on whether informing a patient of positive placebo effects
disables those effects. If placebo instructions have no deleterious
effect, then no change in informed consent law is required. Doctors
must tell patients that they are using a placebo therapy; there should
161
be no loss in efficacy. But the conventional wisdom among doctors
162
is that informing patients of placebo effects disables those effects. If
they are correct, then there appears to be serious tension between the
goals of obtaining consent and taking advantage of placebo effects.
One theory that might resolve the tension is that a patient’s
initial consent to treatment by a physician constitutes consent to all
specific treatments that physician employs. In other words, the
163
patient consents to the doctor rather than consent to the treatments.
Perhaps in part because few courts have squarely confronted the
question of consent to placebo therapy, no case law supports this
view. It is true that it is a battery for one doctor to tell a patient that
that doctor will perform a treatment but have another doctor actually
164
perform the treatment. But it is incorrect to draw from these cases
the negative implication that it is acceptable to not disclose treatment.
Other cases hold that it is a battery for a doctor to promise one
165
treatment but deliver another. Together the two sets of cases imply
that consent is given to specific treatments by specific physicians, not
just to specific physicians. It is also surely the case that a patient could
explicitly consent to all treatments by a physician. But such consents
are rare. Even then, courts are likely to ask the physicians to inform
patients of the risks of such blanket consents, including the possibility

161. Nor is there a problem with patients’ ability to consent to a pure placebo. See, e.g.,
Suenram v. Soc’y Valley Hosp., 383 A.2d 143, 147 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1977) (holding that a patient
has fundamental right to consent to a treatment, laetrile, on the advice of a doctor, whether or
not the treatment is approved by the state and even if the treatment is merely a “mildly toxic
placebo”).
162. See, e.g., Jurcich v. Gen. Motors Corp., 539 S.W.2d 595, 600 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976)
(reporting that the defendant’s expert doctors opined that informing the plaintiff that he was
given a placebo would defeat the placebo effect).
163. See Boozang, supra note 1, at 737–39 (suggesting that, under any of a number of
different theoretical models, patients could implicitly or explicitly consent to any treatment—
including placebo therapies—offered by their physicians).
164. Robin Cheryl Miller, Annotation, Recovery by Patient on Whom Surgery or Other
Treatment Was Performed by One Other than Physician Who Patient Believed Would Perform It,
39 A.L.R.4th 1034, 1035 (1985) (citing Perna v. Pirozzi, 457 A.2d 431, 438 (N.J. 1983)).
165. See HALL ET AL., supra note 160, at 202.

MALANI IN FINAL2.DOC

450

11/16/2008 9:52:18 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:411

166

that the patient will receive placebo therapies. Depending on what
future research on placebo instructions reveals, it may be that even
the possibility of placebo therapies defeats placebo effects.
Turn now to the second case, in which a doctor wants to employ
drug A rather than B because of placebo effects from drug A. Must
doctors inform their patients that their choice of drug A was
motivated by placebo effects? This case is different than the first case
because drug A may actually have pharmacological effects. If drug A
has superior pharmacological effects to drug B, then there is no
problem: the doctor is within her rights to tell the patient that she has
chosen drug A over drug B on the basis of pharmacological effects.
This statement would neither be deceptive nor would it disable
placebo effects. (Consent law does not require doctors to tell patients
other reasons for choosing A over B so long as the doctor does not
167
have a financial conflict of interest. ) But what about the harder
case, in which the pharmacological effects favor B but the placebo
effects and total—placebo plus pharmacological—effects favor A?
The possibility is not remote. Malani (2006) found that placebo
168
effects could reverse the ordinal ranking of drugs. For example,
based solely on pharmacological effects, ranitidine (Zantac) is the top
169
H2-blocker. Based on the sum of pharmacological and placebo
170
effects, however, Nizatidine (Axid) is the top H2-blocker. With
respect to statins, pharmacological effects suggest that lovastatin
(Mevacor) is the second most effective statin, but accounting for
placebo effects suggests that simvastatin (Zocor) is the second best
171
statin.
Fortunately, and for all practical purposes, existing consent law
likely allows doctors to choose A over B without informing patients
that placebo effects are determinative. One reason is that most
litigation focuses on downside risks (side effects) rather than on
172
upside potential (efficacy). In my hypothetical, however, the doctor

166. See, e.g., Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987, 993–94 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that a lack of
precision in a waiver of the right to sue barred enforcement under New York law).
167. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 158, at 328–30.
168. See Malani, supra note 2, at 252 tbl.6.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. The four elements of an informed consent claim are a specific risk was not disclosed,
the doctor did not disclose that risk, the undisclosed risk materialized, the patient would not
have consented had the risk been disclosed. See, e.g., HALL ET AL., supra note 160, at 203. Note
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173

chooses A over B because of efficacy. Courts rarely require that
doctors report the relative probability of success of alternative
174
treatments.
The third question is whether a doctor may avoid nocebo effects
by not informing a patient of a material side effect because it is a
nocebo effect. The doctor’s motivation is that if the doctor does not
tell the patient about the side effect, the patient will not experience
the nocebo effect. Note that tension necessarily exists between the
duty to inform subjects of risks and the desire to avoid nocebo effects
only if the patient is not sensitive to placebo instructions. (This
tension is exactly opposite from the first case of pure placebos, in
which there is tension with informed consent only if the patient is
175
sensitive to placebo instruction. ) If the patient is sensitive to
placebo instruction, that is, the instruction will disable even nocebo
effects, then the doctor has no excuse for withholding information
about nocebo side effects because any ill effects can be removed by
also informing the patient that these side effects have no
pharmacological basis. If, however, the patient is insensitive to such
instruction, then it might appear that the only way to avoid nocebo
effects is for the doctor to withhold information on material risks.
Upon closer examination, however, it is less clear there is any
tension. First, the doctor could ask the patient whether or not the
patient would like to hear about side effects from the proposed
treatment. The patient might rationally say no, and thereby waive the
right to claim a lack of informed consent. The only practical limits to
this strategy are that many patients might still want to hear about the
side effects and that the strategy would only reduce side effects for
proposed treatments with worse-than-average levels of such effects.
The explanation behind the latter limit is that even patients who are

that the elements are couched in terms of undisclosed risks, not efficacy. The only context in
which a suit is brought based on upside potential is when the doctor fails to disclose an
alternative treatment that is better. See, e.g., id. at 210. But no case holds the doctor liable for
not being optimistic enough about the recommended treatment if she does disclose the
alternative treatment.
173. Following the logic of my discussion, if a doctor prefers A to B because B has larger
nocebo effects, then the doctor ought to be able to disable those effects by informing the patient
that some side effects are simply nocebo effects. I take up the case in which nocebo effects can
only be disabled by not informing patients of those effects in the next paragraph of the main
text. See infra text accompanying notes 175–78.
174. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 158, at 315 (“The probability of success . . . is rarely
discussed by the courts.”).
175. See supra notes 162–63 and accompanying text.
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not informed about side effects do not believe there are no side
effects. They believe that the drug has an average side effect profile.
With nocebo effects, this might cause them to experience an average
level of nocebo effects. Only if the proposed treatment has worsethan-average side effects would revealing those effects result in more
severe nocebo effects.
Second, existing law may not require the doctor to reveal nocebo
176
side effects. Recall that either medical custom or the patient’s need
can determine which risks are material. It is possible that medical
177
custom is not to reveal nocebo effects. Moreover, if a patient’s need
is determined by reference to an objective standard (the “reasonable”
patient), courts may decide that such a patient would prefer not to
hear about side effects if hearing about it increases the probability of
experiencing the side effect. These are big “ifs”. A skeptical judge or
jury may dismiss evidence supporting defendants’ claims about
custom or the reasonable patient. And in the small minority of
jurisdictions that employ a subjective patient standard for
178
materiality, the suit itself will suggest that the patient thought the
information material. In these cases, a direct conflict will remain
between existing informed consent law and prevention of nocebo
effects.
Because of the strong tension between existing informed consent
law and managing expectation effects (in the context of pure placebo
therapies and nocebo-related side effects), the following central
normative question arises: should courts or—when constitutionally
permitted—legislatures exempt expectation-based therapies from the
disclosure requirements of informed consent law? The answer
depends on the costs of an exemption. Some people will view
nondisclosure to be a direct violation of their personal autonomy.
Some will be concerned that doctors may abuse the privilege by
176. The therapeutic privilege exception to the requirement to reveal material risks does not
protect a doctor’s decision not to disclose nocebo risks. That privilege generally applies only
when the disclosure prevents the patient from making a rational decision or causes the patient
to suffer psychological harm, not physical harm. HALL ET AL., supra note 160, at 207.
177. Analogously, Boozang answers the first question—whether doctors may prescribe a
placebo without revealing it to be such—by suggesting it could be custom not to reveal this
information. Boozang, supra note 1, at 739. Under black-letter law, custom is not an effective
defense because the treatment itself is always material. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 158, at
311. No reference to custom is required. Only with respect to the risks from treatment is custom
probative of materiality.
178. See HALL ET AL., supra note 160, at 201 (noting the minority status of the subjective
patient-centered disclosure standard).
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prescribing placebos in the absence of evidence on placebo effects or
by refusing to inform subjects of side effects to generate demand for
179
therapies. It is not obvious how these concerns balance against the
180
management of expectation effects.
One argument that counsels toward an exemption or defense
with respect to pure placebo therapies, however, is that doctors and
patients do not have conflicting interests. Neither wants the patient to
get worse. Unless doctors (or their employers) are capitated with
respect to drug costs, they have no financial incentive to prescribe
placebo over nonplacebo medicines when the former would do less to
promote patients’ health. To address the likely rare cases in which
there is a conflict, courts ought to require that doctors prove they are
not financially conflicted as a precondition for exercising the
181
defense. In theory, a simple condition could also reduce the risk of
abuse under an exemption for nocebo side effects: a doctor may raise
the defense of nocebo effects to a claim of nondisclosure of material
risks only if the doctor can demonstrate that the prescribed drug has
nocebo effects. In practice, however, this defense is unlikely to
facilitate optimal control of nocebo effects. For one thing, doctors are
unlikely to have the data required to demonstrate nocebo effects.
Moreover, if the pharmacological side effects of a drug are the same
as the nocebo side effects, then the nocebo exemption is likely to
interfere with disclosure of the pharmacological side effects (another
cost to personal autonomy). Therefore, unfortunately, there is no
completely satisfactory compromise for the tension between nocebo
effects and patient autonomy.
2. Fraud by Doctors. A concern closely related to informed
consent is whether it is fraud for a doctor to provide a placebo instead
of actual medication. The one court which has entertained such a

179. For a general account of the relationship between personal autonomy and informed
consent, see RUTH R. FADEN, TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & NANCY M. P. KING, A HISTORY AND
THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 7–9 (1986).
180. W. John Thomas notes that Thomas Percival, in his influential 1803 treatise on medical
ethics, embraces efficacy over patient autonomy or controlling physician abuse. See Thomas,
supra note 1, at 315 (citing THOMAS PERCIVAL, MEDICAL ETHICS; OR, A CODE OF INSTITUTES
AND PRECEPTS, ADAPTED TO THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS
31–32 (Classics of Medicine Library 1985) (1803)). Thomas rejects Percival’s balancing because
he fears it will compromise faith in pharmacologically active treatments. Id. at 345–47.
181. The doctor ought to have the burden because the doctor has more information on the
financial arrangement between the doctor and the patient’s insurance plan.
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claim said no. In Jurcich v. General Motors Corp., a nurse employed
by a company gave one of its workers sugar pills for his back pain
183
without revealing that they were sugar pills. Although he could have
complained about the lack of informed consent, the worker instead
sued on a theory of fraud. The court held there was no fraud so long
as the patient’s condition did not worsen as a result of the placebo
184
therapy. The court also stated that the legality of employing a
placebo therapy was more properly the subject of a medical
malpractice suit. Its reasoning was that, according to expert
testimony, the sugar pill would not have worked if the nurse revealed
it to be purely placebo. Because deception was potentially ex ante
beneficial for the worker, the better way for regulating abuse would
be malpractice law, which would determine whether the deception as
treatment was reasonable.
It is possible for a future court to distinguish the Jurcich case. For
example, the worker in Jurcich did not argue detrimental reliance,
that is, that had he known the pill was a placebo, he would have seen
another doctor for nonplacebo medication. A future court may also
address a case where the payment of medical expenses was not
covered by workers compensation, unlike in Jurcich, or health
185
insurance and thus a pecuniary loss for purposes of a fraud action.
Finally, a future court might not find persuasive an expert’s view that
placebo effects are real and that placebo instructions diffuse placebo
effects. Nevertheless, the Jurcich view that malpractice law ought to
186
judge the prescription of placebos seems correct. Fraud law requires
that the plaintiff suffered a pecuniary loss. Because the only recipient
of the plaintiff’s money could be the doctor, this element requires that
the doctor financially benefited from using a placebo. Except in the
peculiar case in which the doctor has a financial interest in prescribing
187
a placebo, deception concerning placebo effects does not benefit the
188
doctor. As the Jurcich court implied about the worker in that case,
some patients have psychosomatic disorders that can only be cured by

182. Jurcich v. Gen. Motors Corp., 539 S.W.2d 595 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
183. Id. at 598–600.
184. Id. at 601.
185. See id. at 601–02.
186. Id.
187. Ironically, Jurcich may be such a case. The employer arguably benefited when the
nurse employee prescribed a sugar pill rather than a more expensive prescription medication
because the employer paid for the worker’s medical expenses.
188. Jurcich, 539 S.W.2d at 600.
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placebo. In such patients, just as in patients with psychological
ailments, traditional models of consent, and thus fraud, may have
little relevance.
3. Medical Malpractice. The logical question that follows is how
medical malpractice law should accommodate expectation effects.
The answer is: no differently than malpractice law accommodates
pharmacological effects. The issue in malpractice cases is whether a
doctor’s treatment of a patient was negligent. The answer hinges, not
on how a treatment works, but whether it works. Nor does medical
malpractice impose theoretical limitations on the nature of treatments
it can evaluate. It is equally comfortable judging physically
noninvasive psychotherapy as it is judging prescription of an
antibiotic. The expectation component of therapies simply mixes a
psychological intervention (manipulation of expectations) with a
physical intervention (prescription of a sugar pill or otherwise
complementary medication). The test for negligence is the same in all
cases: does the treatment conform to medical custom, or, would a
189
reasonable physician administer this treatment?
This is not to say that malpractice litigants and courts would find
it easy to accommodate placebo effects in their cases. The difficulty,
however, would be with proving causation, not with setting the
standard of care. Consider a case in which a patient sues a physician
for employing a therapy for its purported placebo effects even
though, the patient contends, a reasonable physician would not have.
The patient would have to demonstrate that the treatment had no
placebo effects, whereas the physician would respond with evidence
that it did. Both would rely on expert opinion. The complication is
that medical experts know little about placebo effects. It is not the
norm for, say, drug companies to investigate the expectation-related
effects of their treatments. Without more research on which
treatments have placebo effects, it will be hard to find true experts on
the matter and thus hard to reach informed legal judgments about
what constitutes negligent use or nonuse of placebo therapies.
Therefore, it will be some time before placebo effects become grist
for malpractice suits.
Before concluding, I should highlight two other areas of health
law that may be impacted by placebo effects. The first concerns the

189.

See, e.g., HALL ET AL., supra note 160, at 289–90.
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rules governing consent to participate in medical research. The
second concerns the rules governing which treatments are covered by
government-run health plans such as Medicaid. I do not provide a
separate treatment of these topics because my analysis would largely
track earlier discussions. The issues raised by consent for humansubjects research are similar to those raised by consent for treatment.
The issues raised by drug coverage decisions are analogous to issues
raised by the FDA drug approval process.
C. Consumer Protection Law
190

Consider a hypothetical based on the facts of FTC v. QT, Inc.,
191
a false advertising case decided by the Seventh Circuit. The
defendant produces a simple brass bracelet with no known
192
pharmacological effects. Nonetheless, the defendant represents to
193
consumers that the bracelet cures lower back pain. A consumer who
purchases the bracelet but experiences no reduction in back pain
could sue the defendant for common law fraud or under state
consumer protection law. Alternatively, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) could sue—and in QT did—alleging violations of
194
Sections 5(a) and 12(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The
195
former prohibits “unfair or deceptive” trade practices broadly and
196
the latter targets false advertising in particular. The central element
in all these claims is that the defendant made a representation that
197
had no reasonable basis or that it knew was false. In response, the
defendant may assert a defense of “puffery,” which protects certain
198
boastful but unsupported claims by defendants.
Research on placebo effects raises two questions about how
consumer protection law ought to handle this fact pattern. First,
should the defendant be allowed to claim that its bracelet cures pain
in order to generate expectations that might trigger placebo effects

190. FTC v. QT, Inc., 512 F.3d 858 (7th Cir. 2008).
191. Id. at 858.
192. Id. at 861.
193. Id. at 860–61.
194. 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a), 52(a) (2006).
195. Id. § 45(a).
196. Id. § 52(a).
197. See DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE
LAW § 2:9, at 41 (2007) (common law fraud); id. § 3:9, at 124–26 (state consumer protection
statutes); id. § 10:3, at 769 (Federal Trade Commission Act).
198. See id. § 2:17, at 68–71.
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from its product? In other words, should the defendant be allowed to
employ advertising to create placebo effects? Second, assuming the
bracelet already has placebo effects, should the defendant be able to
claim that the bracelet reduces pain, even though it has no
pharmacological effect?
Existing law has well-settled answers to these questions. The
defendant cannot claim the bracelet cures pain in order to generate
placebo effects. Such a claim without prior reasonable basis is false
advertising. Puffery is no defense. Puffery protects nonfactual claims,
199
that is, claims that cannot be falsified under existing science. But the
defendant’s claim is factual: whether the bracelet ameliorates pain
can be verified by either straightforward observational or
experimental study. Even if the defendant did not sell its product
until there was evidence of placebo effects (as was partly the
200
defendant’s claim in QT ), it cannot advertise that its product
reduces pain. Several courts, most notably the Ninth Circuit in FTC v.
201
Pantron I Corp., have held that advertising a product is effective on
the basis of placebo effects is “misleading” because the product is not
“inherently effective, its results being attributable to the
202
psychosomatic effect produced by . . . advertising and marketing.”
But are these the right answers? Consider, first, therapeutic
claims made to generate placebo effects. Whether the existing law has
it right depends on whether nonfalsifiable or vague claims can
generate placebo effects. If so, then the defendant’s therapeutic
claims produce no better health outcomes than mere puffery would
have, and the approach under the law does not reduce welfare.
Unfortunately, the literature on placebo effects does not indicate
199. See, e.g., David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1395,
1402–03 (2006).
200. See FTC v. QT, Inc., 512 F.3d 858, 862 (7th Cir. 2008).
201. FTC v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994).
202. Id. at 1100 (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. An Article . . . ACUDOT . . . , 483 F. Supp. 1311, 1315 (N.D. Ohio 1980)); see also QT, Inc., 512 F.3d at 863; An
Article . . . ACU-DOT . . . , 483 F. Supp. at 1315 (“This Court resists the impulse to allow
claimant to market a product that works only by means of a placebo effect on the basis that it
nevertheless often achieves a relief of pain as claimed. . . . [T]he claims are inherently
misleading.”); T-UP, Inc. v. Consumer Prot. Div., 801 A.2d 173, 185–86 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2002) (“[W]e are dealing with the advertising of purported cures or treatments for lifethreatening diseases. . . . [A] reasonable basis for such product claims requires at least two
adequate, well-controlled, double-blinded clinical studies.”). But see QT, Inc., 512 F.3d at 863
(expressing skepticism of Pantron I’s view that placebo effects are always worthless to
consumers, but not deciding the issue because the defendant made false claims in addition to
claiming placebo effects).
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whether a nonfalsifiable or vague claim can generate the same
placebo effects as its complement. The only serious study on placebo
effects from advertising, by Shiv, Carmon, and Ariely, found placebo
effects but employed readily testable claims about their energy drink
203
treatment.
The right answer will also depend on whether there are hidden
costs to generating placebo effects through otherwise unsupported
claims about therapeutic value. For example, is there detrimental
reliance in that consumers purchase the advertised product with
placebo effects instead of another product with superior
204
pharmacological effects? Alternatively, do artificially generated
placebo effects cause consumers to direct their energies (behaviorally
or physiologically) to complement an otherwise useless product
rather than one that will make better use of that energy? In other
words, do pure placebos produce smaller placebo effects, per unit, of
a consumer’s energy than pharmacologically active therapies with
placebo effects? Again, existing research does not answer this
question.
In the interim, a reasonable compromise might be to allow the
defendant a defense that its claim generated placebo effects. The
defendant would bear the burden of demonstrating that, after it
began advertising, its product began having placebo effects. This
claim could be demonstrated just as a drug company might estimate
the placebo effects of a new drug, for example, with an unblinded
experiment or an observational study. The plaintiff could dispute the
evidence by asserting that the defendant inadequately controlled for
selection bias. Courts already have experience with such factual
205
disputes.
This defense is incompatible with existing law’s stance that
claiming a product is effective based merely on prior evidence of

203. See Shiv et al., supra note 103, at 390. The study found increased placebo effects when
participants were presented with instructions that read, “Drinks such as SoBe have been shown
to improve mental functioning, resulting in improved performance on tasks such as solving
puzzles. In fact, the Web site of SoBe includes references to over 50 scientific studies suggesting
that consuming drinks like SoBe can significantly improve mental functioning . . . .” Id.
204. Detrimental reliance does not block a firm from advertising a product with known
pharmacological effects even though such advertising might cause consumers to choose its
product rather than a competitor’s superior product.
205. See, e.g., State v. Black, 537 A.2d 1154, 1157 (Me. 1988) (holding that selection bias
impaired the validity of an expert’s testimony on sexual abuse because “[n]o comparison testing
was done with children who were not victims of sexual abuse”).
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placebo effects is misleading because it is the advertising, not the
physical product, that generates those effects. But it is wrong-headed
to forego valuable placebo effects simply because they are not
206
“inherent[]” in a given product. The fact that any physical substance
can generate the same placebo effects reflects a misunderstanding of
the consumer good that is being produced. That good is the placebo
effect itself. A physical substance, whether a bracelet or a pill, is
simply an input into this good. The fact that any physical substance
can suffice just means there are fewer barriers to entry into the
market for the production of placebo effects. By most accounts, lower
barriers to entry are a good thing. A rule that quashes advertising
based on placebo effects bars the promotion of—or at least artificially
raises the price of—an otherwise valuable product. Without a better
207
argument, Pantron I and its ilk should be overruled on this point.
D. Tort Law
In this Section, I consider the implications of placebo effects for
tort law and fault-based compensation regimes, such as workers’
compensation, intended to displace common law torts. I cannot
emphasize enough that this analysis is more speculative than that of
fields previously examined because there is virtually no evidence of
nocebo effects outside the medical-therapeutic context. Even in the
therapeutic context the evidence is limited to a few treatments and
the clinical trial context. This absence of evidence implies there is
little basis for litigating such effects in tort suits. I do not treat the
absence of such evidence, however, as completely obviating the need
for discussion of tort in this Article because there is a sense, at least in
208
the defense bar, that many litigated injuries are psychosomatic.

206. See An Article . . . ACU-DOT . . . , 483 F. Supp. at 1315 (emphasis omitted).
207. Perhaps one could argue that belief itself is a finite commodity. For example, if the
defendant in QT, Inc. convinced a consumer that its bracelet reduced pain, the consumer would
be less likely in an absolute sense to believe that, say, a pharmacologically active analgesic
reduced pain. Not only is there no evidence for this view, but it is not even a recognized theory
about the production of belief.
208. See, e.g., Sol Bobst, Toxic Mold as a Misnomer, COLUMNS—MOLD, Nov. 2005, at 2, 3
available at http://www.harrismartin.com/pdfs/article/Article6213.pdf; James K. Archibald,
Venable LLP, The Nocebo Effect (1997), http://www.venable.com/publications.cfm?action=
view&publication_id= 366&publication_type_id=2; see also Jeff Nesbit, Evil Twin of ‘Placebo
Effect’ Merits More Serious Study, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1997, at B7 (asserting that the nocebo
effect may be responsible for injuries associated with silicon breast implants, side effects
associated with the fat-substitute Olestra, and Gulf War syndrome).

MALANI IN FINAL2.DOC

460

11/16/2008 9:52:18 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:411

1. Is the Defendant at All Responsible? The Distinction between
Somatoform Injuries and Nocebo Effects. It is not surprising, then,
that defendants have repeatedly asserted as a defense that purported
injuries have psychological causes for which the defendant is not
209
210
responsible. For example, in Okafor v. Best Buy, the claimant
slipped on a wet floor and suffered injuries to her back, leg, and
211
hand. After some months, the company petitioned the state’s
industrial accident board for permission to terminate the claimant’s
workers’ compensation benefits based on a physician’s testimony that
212
many of the claimant’s symptoms were psychosomatic. The board
granted the petition and a trial court upheld the board’s decision as
213
based on substantial evidence. In Lee v. Secretary of the Department
214
of Health and Human Services, the petitioner complained that a
hepatitis B vaccine caused her to suffer fibromyalgia, a chronic pain
215
disorder. She sought compensation under the National Vaccine
Injury Compensation Program, and the government suggested that
216
her pain was likely due to a nocebo effect. The U.S. Court of
Federal Claims rejected the defense because, among other things, the
217
government’s expert was a rheumatologist, not a psychologist. In
these cases, the defendant asserted a psychosomatic origin for the
plaintiff’s injury to defeat causation, though one can imagine that
assertion might also be used to support arguments for comparative
negligence or failure to mitigate.
An important source of confusion in these cases is the distinction
between nocebo effects or psychosomatic injury, on one hand, and
somatoform disorder, on the other. Courts often use these terms

209. A Westlaw search for psychosomatic, nocebo, or placebo effect, limiting cases to those
concerning tort, workers’ compensation, or other compensation systems, yields over 500 hits.
The precise search was “((psychosomat! “placebo effect” nocebo) & (“disability benefits”
compensation “industrial commission” tort! neglig! auto!) % (malpractice mislabel! “false
advertising” “Federal Trade Commission” “F.T.C.”))” in the Allcases database. There were 670
hits on August 28, 2008.
210. Okafor v. Best Buy, No. 05A-07-002 JTV, 2006 WL 2997480 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 31,
2006).
211. Id. at *1.
212. Id. at *2–3.
213. Id. at *4–5.
214. Lee v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 03-2479V, 2005 WL 1125672
(Fed. Cl. May 6, 2005).
215. Id. at *1.
216. Id. at *11.
217. Id. at *15.
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interchangeably. But they describe different phenomena.
Somatoform disorder is the existence of physical symptoms without
218
evidence of physical disease. It implies nothing about cause. A
diagnosis of psychosomatic injury is one which attributes the
symptoms to a psychological trigger, but not necessarily
219
expectation. In colloquial use, either expectation of injury or desire
for the consequences of injury (compensation or medical and familial
attention) can be the motivation. A nocebo effect is an injury
triggered, at least in part, by the plaintiff’s expectation of injury from
the defendant’s action. In all three cases, the injury is genuine. But
the implications for tort differ. Somatoform disorder can be thought
of as a psychological ailment, like depression, and for this reason is
compensable in tort, subject to the usual limits on compensation for
220
infliction of emotional distress. The harm from psychosomatic
disorder is likewise compensable, but because it suggests that the
plaintiff’s mental state is an origin for injury, it tends to undercut the
plaintiff’s claim that the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries or to
221
support a defendant’s comparative negligence or mitigation claims.
The same can be said for the nocebo effect, which is merely a special
case of psychosomatic injury.
2. Who Is Primarily Responsible for the Harm? To fully
understand the implications of nocebo effects for tort, it is best to
start from first principles rather than existing case law. Nocebo effects
pose a problem for torts because they raise the possibility that there
are two causes of a plaintiff’s injury: the defendant’s negligent action
and the plaintiff’s unreasonable expectation of harm from the
defendant’s action. The central question is to whom one ought to
assign responsibility for the incremental harm from the plaintiff’s
unreasonable expectation. (A secondary—though no less vexing—

218. See Robert C. Smith & Francesca C. Dwamena, Classification and Diagnosis of Patients
with Medically Unexplained Symptoms, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 685, 686 (2007) (defining
various types of somatoform disorder).
219. See Somatoform Disorders, Merck Manual Home Edition (2008), http://www.merck.
com/mmhe/sec07/ch099/ch099a.html (“[T]he term [psychosomatic] was once used to refer to
physical symptoms that appear to be caused or worsened by mental factors, rather than by a
physical disorder.”).
220. See, e.g., Bahura v. S.E.W. Investors, 754 A.2d 928, 939 (D.C. App. 2000) (holding that
multiple chemical sensitivity disorder from air pollution at EPA headquarters is a compensable
injury).
221. But see Wasiak v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 568 N.W.2d 229, 233 (Neb. 1997) (finding
that somatization might result from an auto accident caused by the defendant).
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question is how to determine the magnitude of the damages from
unreasonable expectations.) To the extent that they are subject to the
control of the plaintiff, nocebo effects may not require any
fundamental changes because tort law already has doctrines such as
comparative negligence and mitigation to handle victim precaution.
These doctrines would transfer losses back to the plaintiff when the
plaintiff fails to avoid unreasonable nocebo effects. In general, I
predict research will show that nocebo effects are controllable if they
are a behavioral phenomenon rather than a physiological
phenomenon, based on the logic that individuals do not have control
over internal physiological processes such as immune response or
other hormone production. If I am correct, then evidentiary conflict
should focus, not only on whether the defendant’s action and the
plaintiff’s injury are subject to nocebo effects, but whether those
effects have a predominantly physiological mechanism or not.
Although existing doctrines governing victim precaution provide
some structure for how tort law might manage controllable placebo
effects, they do not fully determine the appropriate response. Those
doctrines are premised on being able to identify what is “reasonable”
behavior by the victim. Reasonableness is a ubiquitous standard in
tort, but it does not have a single, consistent meaning in all contexts.
With respect to nocebo effects, for instance, it is not obvious what for
the plaintiff constitutes a reasonable expectation of harm. A
common-sense view might be that reasonable here means “correct.”
For instance, a person’s expectations about the pharmacological
effect of the defendant’s action or product are reasonable if they are
correct. An action can have a pharmacological effect. For example, a
defendant pollutes your drinking water with toxic chemicals.
Conversely, under a reasonable-expectation standard for, say,
comparative negligence, a defendant ought to be liable only for the
portion of damages that would remain if the plaintiff’s expectations
had been correct. The common-sense view, however, is not
222
necessarily the efficient view. The Hand formula, or at least a
sophisticated version of it, would suggest balancing the marginal cost
to the plaintiff of controlling expectations against the marginal
223
benefit in terms of reducing the injury. This standard may lead,

222. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
223. Even in the product liability context, in which there is strict liability for, for example,
failure to warn, the specific dangers that the defendant must broadcast—those the defendant
knew or should have known—are judged by a reasonableness standard. See RICHARD A.
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however, to counterintuitive results: requiring the plaintiff to expect
that the defendant’s action or product is perfectly safe (if there are
nocebo effects and expectations are very easy to manipulate) or that
it is completely dangerous (if the product has inverse placebo effects
rather than nocebo effects). Such complexity may make an efficiencydriven standard difficult for juries to grasp. The result could be
erroneous decisions. Indeed, it may well be that the costs of
implementing an efficient standard—including the risk of jury error—
outweigh the productivity gains from such a standard. For the
remainder of the discussion, I assume this is true and simply assume
224
reasonable expectations are correct expectations.
The analysis changes if the plaintiff cannot control nocebo
225
effects. The problem then resembles the case of joint tortfeasors. A
first defendant contributes, say, a dangerous product, and a second
defendant contributes information that causes the plaintiff to have
unreasonable expectations of the harm from the product. One
difficulty is identifying the second defendant. The plaintiff may not
even be able to identify the source of the information about the first
defendant’s product. Even if the plaintiff did know the source, there
may be multiple possible sources of that information. Another
difficulty is that the second defendant may be effectively immune
from suit. For example, if the source is the press, the First
Amendment protects it from liability for generating unreasonable
expectations. Although product disparagement is actionable, due to
226
free speech concerns it is limited to cases involving actual malice. In
practice, this scienter requirement almost always prevents courts from
assigning any nocebo liability to the press. Alternatively, the source of
the plaintiff’s information may be the plaintiff’s attorney. But
227
attorney-client communications are not admissible in federal court

EPSTEIN, TORTS § 16.12.2, at 418 (1999). Moreover, mitigation, which may limit damages even
when the defendant’s liability is strict, is subject to a reasonable-choice standard. See id. § 17.7,
at 448.
224. This is not to say it is easy to determine what the plaintiff’s expectation was or what the
correct expectation is. But those more technical topics are better suited to an in-depth analysis
of placebo effects in tort rather than an overview like this Article.
225. Under an efficiency standard, this paragraph applies when it is more costly to plaintiffs
to control their expectations than it is for the source of the plaintiffs’ expectations to regulate
the flow of information to the plaintiffs.
226. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 502, 510–13 (1984).
227. See FED. R. EVID. 501 (incorporating common law principles of privilege into the
Federal Rules of Evidence).
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and are admissible only in limited situations in most state courts.
Although the legal authority for the attorney-client privilege is
statutory, there may be federal constitutional hurdles, namely, due
process or the right to counsel, that limit exceptions to the rule in
229
order to allow proof of causation in a nocebo suit.
If the incremental losses due to expectations cannot practically
be assigned to the second defendant, the question arises: should they
be assigned to the first defendant or to the plaintiff? When the
dangers from the first defendant’s action and the nocebo effects from
unreasonable expectations about that action are of the same type, as
when nocebo effects exacerbate the side effects of a drug product,
joint and several liability may apply. The rationale is that when
damages cannot be easily apportioned among defendants, the
residual losses ought to fall not on the plaintiff but on the available
defendant because, among other things, the injured plaintiff must be
230
adequately compensated for his or her loss. Many states, however,
abandoned joint and several liability in the 1980s due to concerns
about inequitable allocations to defendants who contributed only
231
slightly to the plaintiff’s injury. In these states, one might be
232
tempted to apply the eggshell skull rule: that defendants take
plaintiffs as defendants find them. In the nocebo context, this would
mean that the defendant bears the risk that plaintiffs have
unreasonable expectations. The problem with applying the eggshell
skull rule to nocebo effects, however, is that the rule applies to
preexisting conditions of the plaintiff and not to injuries caused by
unreachable codefendants. That leaves states with mere several
liability—as well as states that would revisit joint and several liability
in the case of nocebo claims—at the original question: should the
nocebo losses fall on the first defendant or the plaintiff? My sense is

228. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 cmt. d (2000)
(“In most of the states, the [attorney-client] privilege is defined by statute or rule . . . .”).
229. See, e.g., United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that
the government violated the Constitution by requiring an accounting firm, KPMG, to cease
paying legal fees for its indicted employees).
230. See Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., Inc., 454 N.E.2d 197, 205 (Ill. 1983) (“Elimination of joint
and several liability would work a serious and unwarranted deleterious effect on the ability of
an injured plaintiff to obtain adequate compensation for his injuries.”).
231. For a survey, see Anup Malani & Charles Mullin, Assessing the Merits of Reallocation
Under Joint and Several Liability, with an Application to Asbestos Litigation (Univ. of Va. Law
Sch. John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 18, 2005), available at
http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1035&context=uvalwps.
232. See Vosburg v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403, 404 (Wisc. 1891).
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that the proper answer is to assign additional losses from even
233
unreasonable expectations to the available defendant. The reason is
that, although plaintiffs cannot control their exposure to
unreasonable information about the harm from the first defendant’s
action, that defendant may be in a good position to counteract that
information with positive spin—some call it simple advertising—
about the safety of its actions.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article is to review the scientific literature on
placebo effects and begin a discussion of possible implications for
legal regulation. First, it argues that the FDA should either correct
bias from placebo effects in estimating whether a drug is
pharmacologically effective or should credit placebo and nocebo
effects in making judgments about whether a drug is safe and
effective enough to market. Second, this Article contends that the law
should allow placebo effects as a defense to claims that a doctor did
not obtain informed consent from a patient or a company falsely
advertised that its (pharmacologically inert) product had a health
benefit. Finally, placebo effects complicate tort law. Fortunately,
much of the trouble can be managed using existing doctrines of
comparative negligence and mitigation.
My discussion of placebo effects is not intended to be exhaustive.
Indeed, there are some important legal fields and questions it has not
touched. For example, in administrative law, is it arbitrary and
capricious for an agency to consider placebo effects in its
decisionmaking? In contract law, can placebo effects be the basis for
consideration or even expectation damages? In the interstice between
contract and tort, ought it to be actionable as tortious inference with a
business relationship to say that a competitor’s product is a pure
placebo? (Relatedly, in First Amendment law, do proven expectation
effects alter the level of protection afforded commercial, and even
perhaps noncommercial, speech?) Finally, in libel, can nocebo effects
count as harm to the plaintiff? In many of these cases, the analysis
will follow the same pathways it does when considering the impact of
placebo effects on drug law, health law, consumer protection law or
tort law.

233. To be clear, the first defendant should in any state be assigned losses from its product
assuming the plaintiff has reasonable expectations.
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Therefore, it is useful to conclude with a summary of open
research questions that will pin down legal reforms in those areas.
First, how prevalent are expectation effects? Specifically, do placebo
or nocebo effects attach to therapies outside the clinical trial context?
The answer is relevant to whether the law of informed consent should
permit doctors to omit mention of certain side effects and whether the
FDA ought to consider expectation effects in its approval decisions.
Relatedly, do nocebo effects operate outside the therapeutic context?
This question is relevant to whether expectation effects impact tort
law. Second, can pure placebos have placebo effects? Do they require
specific instructions about health benefits? The answer to the first
query impacts whether informed consent has to deal with pure
placebo prescriptions and whether consumer protection law ought to
overturn Pantron I and accommodate claims of placebo efficacy. In
addition, the answer to the second query impacts whether the FDA
must confront the awkward decision to approve a pure placebo.
Third, do placebo or nocebo instructions disable placebo or nocebo
effects, respectively? If so, then both drug law and informed consent
law may have to live with asymmetric approaches to placebo and
nocebo effects. Fourth, can individuals control either the beliefs that
generate nocebo effects or the consequences that flow from these
beliefs? The answer will determine which doctrines in tort ought to
govern allocating losses from nocebo effects. Fifth, what are the
hidden costs of generating expectation effects? Does it foster
detrimental reliance on therapies that are overall less effective? Does
it generally reduce faith in conventional medicine? If these costs are
severe, then drug law and consumer protection law should be
cautious about crediting claims of expectation effects. Finally, to what
extent does patient self-selection in its many forms—the decision to
participate in a trial, choice of treatment in a study, choice of
simultaneous treatment outside the study, and attrition from a
study—affect estimates of treatment effects in studies attempting to
estimate placebo effects? Because externally valid estimates are
necessary to value placebo effects, self-selection may lead to
suboptimal legal regulation of these such effects.
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1. Definitions of Placebo and Nocebo Effects.
Does the patient think the therapy will
produce superior or inferior health
outcomes?
Superior
Does this
expectation
cause the
therapy to yield
superior or
inferior health
outcomes?

Superior Placebo effect

Inferior

Inverse placebo
effect

Inferior
Inverse nocebo
effects

Nocebo effect
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Figure 1. Figure 4 from Pollo et al. (2001).
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Table 2. Table 1 from Malani (2006).
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Figure 3. Price and Advertising Results from Shiv, Carmon,
and Ariely (2005).
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Figure 4. Estimation of Pharmacological Effect in
H2-Blocker Trials.
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